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"NO LAW SHALL EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT"
MILLAU

H. RutD

*

A one-subject rule for laws has found its way, in one form or
another, into the constitutions of forty-one of our states. An examination of the general and state digests, the citators, and the weekly
deluge of state advance sheets will disclose that the rule is frequently
invoked by litigants to question the validity of a statute. It could be
expected that a state constitutional provision so widely adopted and
so frequently invoked would have received considerable attention in
the periodicals and treatises. Surprisingly, this is not so., It is the
purpose of this paper to give this constitutional provision some deserved additional attention. An examination will be made of the
history of the provision, its historical purpose, the experience litigants have had in invoking it, and the meaning placed upon it by
the courts. An evaluation will be presented of the efficacy of the
provision in accomplishing its stated objective.
I. INTRODUCTION

The omnibus bill, containing provisions on heterogeneous matters, posed problems for the orderly and rational legislative process
as far back as the Romans. Luce tells of the enactment of the Lex
CaeciliaDidain 98 B.C.; it forbade the proposal of the lex saturaa law containing unrelated provisions. 2 While the omnibus bill
apparently was a source of dissatisfaction as early as colonial times,
the first effort to deal with the problem through constitutional means
was a provision in the Illinois constitution, adopted in 1818. It limited bills appropriating salaries for members of the legislature and
for officers of the government to that subject. In 1843, Michigan
adopted a constitutional amendment limiting laws authorizing the
*Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. The following are the principal discussions of the constitutional onesubject rule: Crawford, Statutory Construction §§ 95, 98 (1940); Freund,
Legislative Regulation 208 (1932) ; Luce, Legislative Procedure 548 (1922) ;
New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems Relating to
Legislative Organization and Powers 68-71 (1938) ; 1 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction §§ 1702, 1711-13, 1720 (3d ed. Horack, 1943) ; E-$erstine, Titles
of Legislative Acts, 9 Md. L. Rev. 197, 212 (1948) ; Horack, Constitutional
Limitations on Legislative Procedurein West Virginia,39 W. Va. L. Q. 294,
303-05 (1933) ; Merrill, Legislation: Subject, Title and Amendment, 13 Neb.
L. Bull. 95 (1934) ; Sinclair, The Operation of a Constitutional Restraint on
Bill-Styling, 2 U. Newark L. Rev. 25, 54-62 (1937) (This discussion of the
New Jersey law is the most thorough and penetrating analysis on subject discussed by this paper.) ; Sweet, Title of Bills Required by Missouri Constitu-

tion, 9 J.Mo. B. 225, 226 (1953) ; Comments, 9 Miami L. Q. 431 (1955) ; 24
U.Chi.L. Rev. 722, 724-26 (1957).
2. Luce, op. cit. supra note 1, at 548-49.
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borrowing of money or the issuance of state stock to a single object.
It was not until 1844, however, that any state placed a general onesubject rule in its constitution; in that year New Jersey adopted
its provision. The idea gained ready acceptance and was soon placed
in the constitutions of most other states. Today, all states except
North Carolina and the New England states have some form of onesubject rule in their constitutions. 8 The Minnesota provision is
typical: "No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall
be expressed in its title."4
Thirty-seven states have adopted substantially the same general
requirement of unity of subject matter. Thirty-two of these states
declare that no law shall embrace more than one subject, while five
announce the rule in terms of object. Two additional states, New
York and Wisconsin, have a constitutional one-subject rule which
is applicable only to private and local laws. Arkansas and Mississippi have constitutional one-subject provisions applicable only to
appropriation bills. Table 1 summarizes these constitutional provisions and also those adopted in a lesser number of states dealing
specially with acts making appropriations.
The purpose of the Minnesota provision and its counter-parts is
expressed well by the court in Minnesota v. Cassidy:
The well-known object of [section 27 of art. IV] was to secure
to every distinct measure of legislation a separate consideration
and decision, dependent solely upon its individual merits, by
prohibiting the fraudulent insertion therein of matters wholly
foreign, and in no way related to or connected with its subject,
and by preventing the combination of different measures, dissimilar in character, purposes and objects, but united together
with the sole view, by this means, of compelling the requisite
support to secure their passage ....

It was not intended, how-

ever, nor should it be so construed as to 'embarrass legislation
by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, And multiplying their number.'"
The New Jersey provision, interestingly, contains a statement
of its purpose in the provision itself:
To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing
in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation
to each other.
6
3. This paper does not explore related provisions found in the rules of
many legislative bodies. Rule XVI, 7, Rules of the House of Representatives
of the United States, has been widely copied; it provides: "No motion or
proposition on a subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment."
4. Minn. Const. art. IV, § 27 (1857).
5. 22 Minn. 312, 322 (1875).
6. N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, para. 4 (1844).
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The primary and universally recognized purpose of the onesubject rule is to prevent log-rolling in the enactment of laws- the
practice of several minorities combining their several proposals as
different provisions of a single bill and thus consolidating their votes
so that a majority is obtained for the omnibus bill where perhaps
no single proposal of each minority could have obtained majority
approval separately.7
Another stated purpose for the provision is to prevent "riders"
from being attached to bills that are popular and so certain of adoption that the rider will secure adoption not on its own merits, but
on the merits of the measure to which it is attached." This stratagem
seems to be but a variation of log-rolling.
Another purpose served by the one-subject rule is to facilitate
orderly legislative procedure. By limiting each bill to a single subject, the issues presented by each bill can be better grasped and
more intelligently discussed. Also, limiting each bill to one subject
means that extraneous matters may not be introduced into consideration of the bill by proposing amendments not germane to the
subject under consideration. It should be noted, however, that this
purpose relates to legislative procedure; it does not aim to eradicate
devices designed to pervert the rule of majority vote but rather to
eliminate rambling, discursive deliberations. This is an internal institutional problem, one that could have been left to the legislative
rules to treat.9
The constitutional provision embodying the one-subject rule
also contains an independent requirement that each bill contain a
title and that that title express the subject or object of the bill. However, these requirements have independent operation; independent
historical bases; and separate purposes. The constitutional title requirement finds its American historical basis in the notorious Yazoo
Act of the Georgia legislature of January 7, 1795.10 Because it was
7. Christie v. Miller, 128 Ga. 412, 57 S.E. 697 (1907); Trumble v.
Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N.W. 869 (1893) ; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn.
575, 50 N.W. 923 (1891) ; Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Tex. 548, 553 (1887) ;
People ex rel. Estes v. Dehany, 20 Mich. 349 (1870) ; People v. Mahaney, 13

Mich. 481, 496 (1865).

8. 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 1 at 1702.
9. This is, of course the purpose of the House rule previously quoted;
it requires amendments offered to be germane to the bill under consideration.
10. The Yazoo Act was entitled, "An act supplementary to an act for
appropriating part of the unlocated territory of this state, for the payment of
the late state troops, and for other purposes therein menioned, and declaring
the right of this state to the unappropriated territory thereof, for the protection and support of the frontiers of this state, and for other purposes." The act
directed the sale of a considerable portion of the public domain of the state
of Georgia to named companies. A deed of January 13, 1795 by the Governor
to a Georgia company composed of James Gunn and others of 500,000 acres
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felt that the act, making substantial grants to private persons, was
smuggled through the legislature under an innocent and deceptive
title, public demand arose for a constitutional requirement that each
bill contain a title which adequately expresses the subject matter of
the bill. At the instance of General James Jackson, a provision to
this effect was inserted in the Georgia constitution of 1798.1" The
primary purpose of the title requirement is to prevent surprise and
fraud upon the people and the legislature. If a title fails to express
adequately the subject matter of the act or is misleading in its expression of the subject of the act, then a portion or all of the act is
held invalid.' 2 While it is the purpose of the title requirement to
prevent legislation by stealth, the one-subject rule also aids in the
eradication of this practice and complements its sister requirement.
Judicial expressions of the purpose of constitutional provisions like
that quoted from the Minnesota opinion generally combine in one
statement the purposes of the two requirements of these provisions.
Thus, the isolation of the separate purposes of the two requirements
of the single constitutional provision is often difficult.
II. JuDiciAL APPLICATION OF THE RULE
The one-subject rule is one of the several provisions inserted in
state constitutions by the constitution makers to regulate the legislative process."8 These provisions regulate the form of laws and
legislative procedure. The first question which arises concerning
these provisions is whether a party to a lawsuit should be permitted
to show that the legislature failed in some particular to comply with
one of these provisions and then to contend that the law enacted
through this defective process is itself void. Two judicial doctrines
insulate from attack laws enacted in violation of one of these constitutional regulations of the legislative process: first, the enrolled bill
doctrine, preventing proof of the fact of violation; and second, the
for 500 per acre was questioned in Fletcher v. Peck, 12 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87
(1810). By an act of February 13, 1796 the Georgia legislature declared the
Yazoo Act null and void for the undue influence and fraud in its enactment.
In a contest between individuals, the Supreme Court held that an innocent
purchaser of the land originally conveyed in the afore-mentioned deed held
good title to the land which could not be affected by the 1796 act.
11. See Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Tex. 548, 555-56, (1887).
12. What constitutes an adequate title for purposes of these constitutional provisions and the consequences of the title being inadequate is an independent, extensive, and troublesome subject. It is not treated here. See 1
Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1708; Manson, The Drafting of Statute

Titles, 10 Ind. L.J. 155 (1934) ; Sinclair, A Constitutional Restraint on Bill
Styling, 2 U. Newark L. Rev. 35 (1937) ; Comments, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1143
(1930) ;23 Tex.L. Rev.378 (1945).
13. See, e.g., Minn. Const. art. IV, §§ 10, 12, 13, 16, 19-22, 27, 30.
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classification of the constitutional provision as directory instead of
mandatory.
The enrolled bill doctrine holds that the enrolled bill, nothing
to the contrary appearing on its face, is an absolute verity, is conclusive of its textual content and of its lawful enactment, and cannot
be impeached by going behind it to the legislative journals or evidence extrinsic of the journals. 4 Minnesota and some other states
follow the journal entry rule, which holds that the enrolled bill is
prima facie evidence that the legislature complied with all the constitutional requirements, but the journal is admissible to rebut the
presumption and impeach the bill.' 5 Neither of these rules can insulate an act from the attack that it violates the one-subject rule
because the fact of violation can be determined from the act itself
without resort to extrinsic evidence.
It seems, then, that the question of the violation of the onesubject rule can be avoided by the courts only by holding that the
rule is merely directory and not mandatory. By holding it directory,
judicial review of the legislative action is denied. However, only
Ohio holds its one-subject provision to be directory.' 6 While there
is some evidence that Minnesota may have once declared the provision to be merely directory, it ip clear now that it is viewed as man7
datory.1
Courts have adopted another common technique for reducing
judicial interference with legislative action, however. They argue
that the constitutional provision should be liberally construed,18 and
that it should be construed so as not to hamper the legislature nor
14. Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 23 N.W.2d 883 (1946), 32 Iowa

L.Rev. 147 (1946) ; Williams v. Taylor, 83 Tex. 667, 19 S.W. 156 (1892).
15. State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246 Minn. 181, 74 N.W.2d 249
(1956) ; Woodward v. Pearson, 165 Ore. 40, 103 P.2d 737 (1940).

16. Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 177 (1856) ; contra, Simms v. Sawyers,

85 W.Va. 245, 101 S.E. 467 (1919).
17. Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923 (1891). The early

case of Board of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 281
(1858), may say that the provision is not mandatory. However, the court

determined that the act embraced but one subject and then went on to categoriie a classification of the constitutional provision as directory as "sense-

less," and the classification of it as mandatory as an "advance in the science of
government worthy of imitation by all states... " The Gilfillen report of

Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Gil. 374 (Minn. 1862) reports the court as having said in
referring to the Heenan case, "we there held . . . that this provision of the
constitution was merely directory.. " However, the Gilfillen report of Minnesota v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341 (1868), aff'd 76 U.S. 35 (9 Wall.) (1869) reports
the court as quoting this statement from Tuttle v. Strout but as inserting a
"not" between "was" and "merely directory." While this ambiguity exists in

the early cases, the number of cases in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
has dealt seriously with the contention that an act embraces more than one
subject makes it clear that the provision is considered mandatory.
18. Austin v. Gulf, C. & S.F. R.R., 45 Tex. 234 (1876).
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to embarrass honest legislation.'9 This means that the courts will
read "subject" or "object" broadly and not narrowly so that the
legislature will not be severely limited in what it may include in a
single bill. Judge Mitchell expresses lucidly the approach of the
courts in these cases when he declares in Johnson v. Harrison:
This provision... is to be given a liberal, and not a strict, construction. It is not intended nor should it be so construed as to
errbarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive
in their scope and operation, or by multiplying their number, or
by preventing the legislature from embracing in one act all matters properly connected with one general subject.20
The one-subject rule, then, is available to the advocate in the
appropriate case as a weapon to strike down an act, and it becomes
important to learn what the rule requires. While Minnesota declares
that no act may embrace more than one subject, most states declare
that no act may contain more than one subject. Whether "embrace"
or "contain" is used seems immaterial; no case was found suggesting that there is any difference between the two terms.
Most of these provisions state the unity requirement in terms
of "subject." Others state the requirement in terms of "object." The
dictionary definition of "subject includes": "an organized body of
knowledge," "subject matter" and "logic- that term of a proposition which denotes what the proposition is about ... the topic of an
affirmation or denial." 21 Subject of an act suggests its subject matter
or that with which it deals.
The dictionary definition of "object" on the other hand, includes:
"that on which the purposes are fixed as the end of action or effort;
that which is sought for; end; aim; motive; final cause." 22 The object of an act suggests its purpose or aim; or the persons, institutions or conduct at which the act is aimed. There is an apparent
difference between requiring an act to deal with a single subject
and to deal with a single object. The first would seem to require
a singleness of the matter dealt with, while the latter to require a
23

singleness of purpose.

19. Illinois v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865 (1908).
20. 47 Minn. 575, 577, 50 N.W. 923, 924, (1891).
21. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language
2509 (2d ed. 1947).
22. Id. at 1679.
23. In making this examination of the two forms of the constitutional
rule by using the dictionary as a tool, I am not unmindful of Judge Learned
Hand's sage advice in Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)
where he declared: "But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to
remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their
meaning."
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One of the best general definitions of "subject" for these purposes is that of Judge Mitchell in Johnson v. Harrison:
Subject... is to be given a broad and extended meaning, so as
to allow the legislature full scope to include in one act all
matters having a logical or natural connection. To constitute
duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar
and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to
each other. All that is necessary is that the act should embrace
some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that
all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea,
be so connected with or related to each other, either logically
or in popular understanding,
as to be parts of, or germane to,
24
one general subject.

The subject of the act for purposes of the one-subject rule has been
variously described as "the leading subject, 2 5 the "general subject
matter,"28 the "core of the statute,"'2 7 and the "one general topic
28

capable of treatment as a unit.1

Five of the thirty-seven states having general unity requirements state the rule in terms of singleness of object.2 The object of
an act has been variously described as "the aim or purpose of the
enactment,"2 " the "general purpose of the act," 31 and "the end
which the legislative act proposes to accomplish.

'3

2

Despite these apparent differences in the character of the unity
required of the body of the act, there is no clear differentiation made
by the courts. An Indiana court, for example, declared: "while the
'object' of an act may not be interchangeable with 'subject,' still we
think the object of an act must be considered in determining whether
matters embraced in the act may be reasonably treated as 'one subject.' "33 An Iowa court, in the face of a constitutional requirement
of one-subject, declared that: "the unity of object is to be looked
for in the ultimate end designed to be attained, and not in the details
24. 47 Minn. at 577, 50 N.W. at 924 (1891).
25. Sullivan v. Westhoff, 38 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
26. McMeans v. Finley, 88 Tex. 515, 521, 32 S.W. 524, 525 (1895).
27. AFL v. Langley, 66 Idaho 763, 769, 168 P.2d 831, 834 (1946).
28. Merrill, supra note 1, at 98.
29. La., Mich., N. J., W. Va., and Va.
30. Kent County ex rel. Bd. of Supervisors v. Reed, 243 Mich. 120, 123,
219 N.W. 656, 657 (1928) ; Pinder v. Board of Supervisors, 146 So. 715, 718
(La. App. 1933).
31. Grand Rapids v. Burlingame, 93 Mich. 469, 472, 53 N.W. 620, 621

(1892).

32. State ex rel. Walter v. Town of Union, 33 NJ.L. 350, 354 (Sup. Ct.
1869).
33. State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 469, 180 N.E. 865, 868

(1932).
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looldng to that end."3 4 A Missouri court refused to make any
sharp distinction between motive, object and subject for purposes
of the constitutional requirement of singleness of subject.35 Ex parte
8
Conner,"
though Georgia requires singleness of subject, tests the
act's compliance with the constitutional rule by use of the act's
avowed purpose and finds plurality because the purpose of the act
was to create four separate corporations. While Michigan requires
singleness of object, a Michigan case relied heavily upon Ex parte
Conner in finding plurality of object in the act under review. 37 Virgiania, which requires a single object, has declared that for these
purposes "object" and "subject" mean substantially the same
38
thing.
The original Texas constitution of 1845 stated the unity requirement in terms of "subject." The 1861, 1866 and 1869 constitutions,
however, stated it in terms of "object." The current constitution,
adopted in 1876, returned to the original "subject." While recognizing that there could be a difference in meaning, it has been
indicated that no real difference exists and that the older cases are
authority under the new constitution89
Because no real difference was discovered in the courts' handling of the question depending upon whether the unity requirement
was stated in terms of "subject" or "object," the cases are not
separately treated in the following discussion. 0 And for simplicity's
sake, the constitutional rule will be spoken of as the one-subject
rule, though both forms are referred to.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALITY

Before the cases in which courts have found a plurality of subject to exist are examined, it seems wise to discuss the consequences
of a finding of plurality. It is important to distinguish the three
situations in which plurality may exist: (1) the body of the act
may contain two or more subjects and the act's title may adequately
express these two or more subjects; (2) the body of the act may
34. Dayton v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. do., 202 Iowa 753, 757, 210 N.W.
945, 946 (1926).
35. Thomas v. Buchanan County, 330 Mo. 627, 51 S.VW.2d 95 (1932).
36. 51 Ga. 571 (1874).
37. Cote v. Village of Highland Park, 173 Mich. 201, 139 N.W. 69
(1912).
38. Ingles v. Straus, 91 Va. 209, 215, 21 S.E. 490, 492 (1895) ; Commonwealth ex rel. City of Richmond v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 118 Va. 261, 270,
87 S.E. 622, 625-26 (1916).
39. Day Land & Cattle Co. v. Texas, 68 Tex. 526, 542, 4 S.W. 865, 872

(1887).

40.

Manson, spra note 12, at 156-57 n. 3 reaches the same conclusion

concerning "object" and "subject" for purposes of the title requirement.
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contain two or more subjects and the title express only one of these
subjects; and (3) the body of the act may contain only one subject
but the act's title may express two or more subjects. The onesubject rule is clearly violated in only the first of these situations.
Where the body of the act contains two or more subjects and
the title expresses but one of these subjects, the sister constitutional
provision requiring the title to express the act's subject comes into
play. Violation of the title requirement produces one of two results,
depending upon the nature of the violation. If the title fails completely to give notice of the contents of the bill or if the title is misleading as to the contents of the bill, the entire act is invalid. However, if the title gives adequate notice of a portion of the contents
of the bill, then only that portion of the act of which the title fails
to give adequate notice is invalid.41 Of course, in order for this rule
to apply, the several portions of the act must be severable. The title
requirement in several state constitutions contain an express severability clause; in other jurisdictions the same result is reached without aid of a constitutional severability clause.
The application of the title requirement, then, to an act of the
kind under discussion will either render the entire act invalid or
reduce the act to a single subject. In either case, no plurality of
subject question would seem to be presented.
Most of the cases which have dealt with an act containing more
than one subject but whose title expresses only one of the subjects
have held that the title requirement has the effect of reducing the
act to the one subject expressed in the title and that this remaining
part of the act is valid.4 2 Several cases have found the entire act
to be invalid, however. A Nevada act entitled: "An act to provide
for the inspection of hides, providing compensation therefore and
other matters relating thereto," provided for the inspection of hides
and also regulated the sales of the meat of neat cattle. The court
found that this regulation of sales was a different subject from that
expressed in the title, that the title was misleading and for that reason the entire act was void. The court then affirmed an order sustaining the accused's demurrer to an indictment on the ground
that the act was unconstitutional because it contained more than
one subject.4 3 While plurality of subject is the technical basis, it
seems that defective title is the real basis for this decision.
41. 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1708; Comment, 23 Tex. L. Rev.
378 (1945).
42. Jones v. Thompson's Ex'r, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 394 (1876) ; State ex
rel. Daubman v. Smith, 47 N.J.L. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1885).
43. State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, 295 Pac. 770 (1931).
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The fourth opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court concerning a
1907 act suggests that in a given situation the court may conclude
that the second subject in the body of the act (which is not expressed
in its title) may have been the inducement for the passage of the
44
act, that therefore the act is not severable and the entire act invalid.
The Nebraska solution may be the soundest. Plurality of subject
matter in the body of the act suggests that log-rolling may have been
employed; log-rolling is the evil at which the one-subject rule is
aimed; as the evil may have existed in the act's passage, the act
should be declared void. The use of the title requirement to reduce
the act to a single subject may employ conceptualism to overlook
political realities. The act may well have been considered by legislators as dealing with both of the subjects set out in the body and
not merely with the single subject expressed in the title; and the
act may have been passed because these two subjects were joined
in it. As this may have been the case, the act should be held invalid.
This is an appealing argument.
Where the body of the act contains only one subject but its title
expresses two or more subjects, a different question is presented.
It is often stated that the one-subject rule is concerned with plurality
in the body of the act, and not in its title. Thus, it is held that an
act of this type is valid.4 5 Of course, the plurality of subjects in the
title could lead a court in some cases to find that the title was misleading and so conclude that the act is invalid. 46 Where the title is
not misleading, however, it seems that the act should be held valid.
The plurality of subjects in the title is insufficient evidence of logrolling to justify a court to strike down the act because it violates
the one-subject rule.
It seems, then, that the issue of violation of the one-subject rule
is squarely presented only where the body of the act contains two
or more subjects and the act's title adequately expresses these sub44. McShane v. Douglas County, 96 Neb. 664, 148 N.W. 569 (1914).
The three previous opinions are McShane v. Nebraska, 93 Neb. 54, 139 N.W.
852 (1913) ; State ex rel. County of Douglas v. McShane, 93 Neb. 46, 139
N.W. 850 (1913) ; McShane v. Douglas County, 95 Neb. 699, 146 N.W. 979
(1914).
45. Illinois v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865 (1908). See Judson v.
City of Bessemer, 87 Ala. 240, 6 So. 267, 268, (1889) ; Eaton v. Guarantee Co.,
11 N.D. 79, 80-81, 88 N.W. 1029, 1030 (1902). Stewart v. Hadley, 327 Pa.
66, 193 Atl. 41 (1937) seems to say that the act in question is invalid merely
because its caption contains two subjects; however, the result can be better
explained either on the ground that the caption is misleading or that the form
of the amendments undertaken is defective.
46. Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, 100 Fla. 1349, 1353-54, 131 So. 178, 180
(1930) at one point seems to say that mere plurality in the title is enough to
invalidate the act, but at another point refers to the Judson case with approval.
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jects. In these cases, the courts generally hold the entire act void.
The courts usually declare that they cannot choose between subjects
in order to hold one valid and the remainder invalid; as they cannot
determine which subject the legislature wished to be law, the courts
find themselves unable to use the doctrine of severability 47 and
must declare the entire act invalid. Several cases, however, have
suggested that the court should determine whether one of the
subjects is of greater dignity or is the dominant subject so that it
can be concluded that the legislature wished that subject to be law
over the others or that the other subjects furnished no special inducement for the passage of the act. The portion of the act dealing
with the dominant subject would thus be found valid and the other
portions invalid. 48
It is very doubtful that the doctrine of severability is applicable
to an act containing two or more subjects adequately expressed by
its title. Where a portion of an act is unconstitutional, the doctrine
of severability saves the constitutional portions and gives them
effect, where to do so will carry out the legislative purpose. Unconstitutionality generally flows from lack of legislative power. The
one-subject rule is not concerned with substantive legislative power.
It is aimed at log-rolling. It is assumed, without inquiring into the
particular facts, that the unrelated subjects were combined in one
bill in order to convert several minorities into a majority. 9 The onesubject rule declares that this perversion of majority rule will not
be tolerated. The entire act is suspect and so it must all fall.48 a If this
is the rationale for the constitutional rule-and it certainly is the
principal one stated by the courts, then it is manifestly unsound
to employ severability to save the provisions dealing with one of
the subjects. The necessary assumption that this will carry out the
legislative purpose, assented to by a majority of the legislators,
cannot be made.
There is one circumstance, however, in which it may be proper
47. State v. Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722 (1856) ; Power, Inc. v. Huntley,

39 Wash.2d 191, 235 P2d 173 (1951).

48. Cashin v. State Highway Commn, 137 Kan. 744, 22 P.2d 939

(1933). See City of Owensboro v. Hazel, 229 Ky. 752, 763, 17 S.W.2d 1031,

1036 (1929).
49. To avoid impugning the motives of the legislators who sponsored
the act under consideration, it is often said that it is not suggested that there
was any log-rolling in the enactment of the act under question but that this
is the kind of act which must be held void to avoid the possibility of log-rolling
in the future.
49a. State ex rel. Hueller v. Thompson, 316 Mo. 272, 278, 289 S.W. 338,
341 (1926). In fact, the only case found in which an entire general appropriation act was invalidated because it violated the one subject rule is Power, Inc.
v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 235 P. 2d 173 (1951). For a discussion of the
special circumstances in that case see footnote 193 and its text.
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to find that an act deals with more than one subject and invalidate
the provisions dealing with all but one of the subjects. It is said
that one of the purposes of the one-subject rule is to prevent riders
from being attached to popular bills so as to secure adoption of the
rider not on its own merits but upon those of the remainder of the
bill. The general appropriation act has, historically, presented a
special temptation for the attachment of these riders. Where it is
clear that a provision dealing with an unrelated subject had this
tactical relationship to the rest of the act, it seems to be consistent
with the rationale of the one-subject rule to hold only the rider
invalid. The troublesome question, though, would seem to be one of
determining when this situation exists.
IV.

MUST THE ONE SUBJECT BE STATED IN THE TITLE?

A literal interpretation of the typical one-subject provision is
that the constitution requires (1) that the act contain only one subject and (2) that this single subject be expressed in the act's title.
While singleness of subject may permit a number of topics or subjects to be treated by a single act so long as these various subjects
are all under one generic heading, the title provision of the constitution would seem to require that this single subject be stated in the
title.
Surprisingly, this question seems to have been squarely raised in
only a few cases. The determination of the question of singleness of
subject and the determination of the question whether the title to
the act gives adequate notice of its subject appear to be largely
independent inquiries in the cases. In the limited number of cases
which have dealt with the precise question, the results have been
diverse.
Several cases have taken the constitutional provision at its
apparent face value and required the statement of the single subject
in the caption. City of Owensboro v. Haze50 involved an act that
had several different provisions relating variously to the city manager form of government, the commission form of city government
and the machinery for changing to and from these forms. In a
declaratory judgment action the court held this statute to be unconstitutional. The court declared, "it cannot be argued successfully that
the real subject of the act here is 'city government,' for the title
to the act instead of being that broad, as perhaps it might have been,
is restrictive in its nature to certain dissimilar forms of govern50. 229 Ky. 752, 17 S.W.2d 1031 (1929).
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ment." 5' Thus, the court indicates that the various provisions of this
act might be all considered one part of one subject-city government, but this subject cannot be used to satisfy the singleness of
subject requirement because it is not stated in the title.
On the other hand, some cases have found various specific provisions of an act all to be portions of one subject for purposes of the
one-subject rule and held the act constitutional even though the
caption did not state the one heading under which the various specific
provisions can be grouped. In Mayor v. Gass, the constitutionality
of a 1907 act entitled:
An act to authorize municipalities of Tennessee having a population by the census of 1900, or any subsequent federal census,
of not less than thirty thousand nor more than forty thousand to
issue $165,000 of coupon bonds, with which to fund the floating
debts of said cities, to increase and improve the fire department,
to widen the streets, and pay damage to property holders caused
by the erection of viaducts and bridges; also to authorize said
cities to
issue $15,000 of coupon bonds with which to build
52
sewers.

The argument that this involved two subjects was rejected by a finding that the subject of the act was the issuance of bonds for
municipal purposes. It should be noted that the caption gives
adequate notice of the contents of this act. It does not literally state
that the subject is the issuance of bonds for municipal purposes.
The specifics stated in the title, however, are clearly examples of the
subject found by the court.53 "Plurality of the title is not an objection
when the several plural provisions deal with, and by necessary construction are but, constituent parts of one subject."54 The Minnesota Supreme Court has lined up with this group of courts and declared that "the general subject need not be stated in the title if it is
clearly disclosed or can be readily inferred from the details expressed
[in the title]."5

However, the mere fact that the various provisions of an act
may properly be placed under one subject heading does not mean
that the act complies with the one-subject rule. A Pennsylvania case
51. Id. at 762, 17 S.W.2d at 1035.
52.

119 Tenn. 438, 440, 104 S.W. 1084 (1907).

53. Illinois v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865 (1908) reaches a similar

conclusion.
54. Kizer v. State, 140 Tenn. 582, 589, 205 S.W. 423, 425 (1918)
(quoted with approval in Trotter v. City of Maryville, 191 Tenn. 510, 235
S.W.2d 13 (1950)).
55. C. Thomas Stores Sales System, Inc. v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504, 512,
297 N.W. 9, 15 (1941).
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respected the legislature's classification of the subject matter of the
act as relating to two distinct subjects. The act was entitled:
An act to regulate the practice of the profession of engineering
and of land surveying; creating a state board for the registration
of professional engineers and land surveyors; defining its powers
and duties; imposing certain duties upon the Commonwealth and
political subdivisions thereof in connection with public work;
and providing penalties.
It was argued that the act violated the one-subject rule because it
dealt with at least two subjects--engineering and land surveying.
The court's language and its reasoning in concluding that the act
violated the constitutional mandate is very instructive:
Thus far we have considered the act as though it dealt with only
a single subject, the profession of engineering; but, both in its
title and throughout all its provisions, this statute is written as
treating of at least two subjects, first, 'engineering' and next,
'land surveying'. As the act is drawn, the latter occupation is
not treated as a mere subordinate branch of the former ...
Furthermore, the act repeatedly refers to 'a professional engineer' and to 'a land surveyor' and really treats them as separate subjects of legislation .... Thus it apparently sets up two

subjects of legislation in one statute, which, of course, is forbidden by our Constitution. It is no answer to say ...that a land
surveyor can justifiably be regarded as a minor engineer, for the
legislature here designedly chose to treat him as otherwise.'
While a literal reading of the constitutional provision may justify
the conclusion that the one subject with which the act deals must
be stated in the title, it seems that the conclusion fails to take full
account of the purposes of the provision.r7 The one-subject rule is
aimed at log-rolling; to prevent log-rolling it limits each act to a
single subject. If the act has unity, then the purpose of this rule is
satisfied. The title requirement is designed to give interested persons notice of the subject of a bill and prevent deception through use
of misleading titles. If the title gives adequate notice, the purpose
of the title requirement is satisfied. Two independent purposes are
served by this constitutional provision, stating the two rules. If the
two purposes are fulfilled in the particular case, the act should be
held valid. A court should not permit a justifiable verbal interpretation to let it lose sight of the purposes of the provision.
56. Commonwealth v. Humphrey, 288 Pa. 280, 291-92, 136 Atl. 213, 217
(1927).
57. Judge Learned Hand has wisely observed, "(T]here is often no
surer way to misconceive the meaning of a statute or any other writing than
to construe it verbally.. . ." Brooklyn Nat. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d
450, 451 (2d Cir. 1946).

ONE-SUBJECT RULE
V. JUDICIAL FINDING OF PLURALITY OF SUBJECT

There are literally hundreds of cases in which the courts have
been called upon to discuss whether a particular act deals with more
than one subject. In the great bulk of these cases, the court concludes that the act deals wit, only one subject. Only a representative
sample of these cases were read in preparing this paper. However,
an effort was made to find and read substantially all of the cases in
which the court finds that the act contains more than one subject.
This approach was taken because it is believed that an understanding
of what the courts consider a "subject" for purposes of this constitutional provision can be best obtained by a careful examination of this
second type of case. An attempt follows to organize these cases
into various logical groupings.
A. An Act Concerning Two Named Entities.
Before the widespread adoption of constitutional prohibitions
against special and local legislation58 and their more specific counterparts-such as those providing that private corporations be incorporated only under general law, and that divorce may not be granted
by legislative act-a fairly common legislative act was one incorporating a named corporation. The clearest cases of plurality of subject are those acts which incorporated two or more named corporations or chartered two or more named cities.
Perhaps the leading case is People ex rel. Estes v. Denahy,59
its opinion having been written by Judge Cooley. A Michigan act
which in three separate provisions appropriated certain non-resident
highway taxes for the improvement of three different state roads
was there held to contain three subjects. Another widely cited
case is Ex parte Conner.6" It held a Georgia act which incorporated
a volunteer corps of infantry in the City of Macon and extended
the provisions of the act to the Floyd Rifles, the French Rifles and
the Irish Volunteers, invalid as containing more than one subject.
Perhaps the clearest case is one which involved an act incorporating
two named banks.6' An Illinois case is somewhat puzzling. A 1927
58. E.g., Minn. Const. art. IV, § 33 (1857) ; Tex. Const art. III, § 56,
57 (1876). For a good discussion of these provisions see Anderson, Special
Legislation in Minnesota, 7 Minn. L. Rev. 133 (1923) ; Cloe & Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L.J. 351 (1936) ; Comment, 28 Tex. L. Rev.
829 (1950).
59. 20 Mich. 349 (1870).
60. 51 Ga. 571 (1874).
61. Council v. Brown, 151 Ga. 564, 107 S.E. 867 (1921). The 1870 act
involved in this case was entitled, "an act to incorporate the Peoples Bank of
Macon- also the Bank of Southwestern Georgia at Americus." Admitting

that it was deciding the case more on instinct than ratiocination, an earlier
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act was construed to authorize any county with a population over
500,000 to establish and maintain a municipal hall and to grant the
same powers to cities situated in such counties. While it was urged
that the purpose of the act was to enable construction of a jointly
used building, the court found that the cities and counties are
different types of local government, voluntary and involuntary local
subdivisions, and that the act embraced more than one subject in
granting these powers to the two subdivisions. 2 This reader is of
the opinion that the court's concern over the financial improvidence
of the construction program influenced its conclusion.
The principle of these cases should, of course, be applied not
only where the several entities are being created by the act but
also where the legislative charters of several entities are being
changed in a single act. For this reason a Michigan court invalidated an act amending the charters of four different villages situated
83
adjacent to Detroit.
The opinions in both the Denahy and Conner cases noted that
the acts before the court, involving private and local benefits, were
the kind that could create the evil at which the constitutional provision was aimed. Judge Cooley remarked in the Denahy case:
[T] here appear to be three distinct objects of legislation [represented by these three roads] .... These objects have certainly
no necessary connection, and being grouped together in one bill,
legislators are not only preclude[d] from expressing by their
votes their opinion upon each [bill] separately; but they are so
united, as to invite a combination of interests among the friends
of each, in order to secure the success of all, when, perhaps, neither could be passed separately. The evils of that species of
omnibus legislation which the constitution designed to prohibit,
are all invited by acts thus framed ....64
The only Minnesota case in which an act has been declared to
violate the constitutional rule is Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. fV a ldron.6' Among other things, the validity of a special act of 1865,
entitled, "an act to authorize the Winona & St. Peter Railway ComGeorgia court held valid an act creating a Board of Commissioners of Roads
and Revenue in six named counties. Spier v. Morgan, 80 Ga. 581, 5 S.E. 768
(1888). Note the doubts expressed about the Spier case in Christie v. Miller,
128 Ga. 412, 414, 57 S.E. 697, 698 (1907), where an act which established
a fee bill in civil cases for the magistrates and constables in the City of Savannah and provided for the payment of costs in criminal cases to officers of
Chatham County was found unconstitutional. The act dealt with local matters
for two different localities- the county and one of the cities in the county.
62. Campe v. Cermak, 330 Ill. 463, 161 N.E. 761 (1928).
63. Cote v. Village of Highland Park, 173 Mich. 201, 139 N.V. 69

(1912).

64.
65.

20 Mich. at 351-52.
11 Gil. 392 (Minn. 1866).
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pany to consolidate with the Minnesota Central Railroad Company,
and to bridge the Mississippi River," was questioned. In response
to the landowner-respondent's argument that the act embraced
more than one subject, namely consolidation, bridging the Mississippi and taxation, the court declared without explanation that this
objection must be sustained. It seems reasonable to conclude that
this act combines two distinct local and private matters; if this is so
then the act bears the earmarks of possible log-rolling and should
be invalidated. 60
The conclusion in these cases seem to carry out the purposes
of the constitutional rule. An act which deals with several distinct
local or private interests is suspect; it has the earmarks of logrolling-of combining several minority interests to get a majority
vote for the whole. The mere fact that all of the local or private
interests relate to a single general subject, such as local militia,
bank incorporations, state roads or powers of municipal government, should not dissuade the court from finding the act invalid. The
combining of these provisions, all of which could reasonably be
grouped under one general subject or heading, was likely the result
of a marriage of convenience only and not intellectual affinity.
Where, however, the act represents a coordinated attack upon
a single general subject but deals with a number of specific situations affecting directly several local and private interests, the act
should probably be sustained. The legislature should not be forced
to fashion fragmentary solutions. The real difficulty here, though, is
in determining whether the act in question is of this kind or of the
kind just condemned.
B. An Act Containing a Repealer.
Acts whose only purpose is to repeal certain laws or whose
purpose includes this purpose have run afoul of the constitutional
one-subject rule. Repeal may be viewed as an independent subject.
A 1955 Kansas act repealed an act concerning the registration
of motor vehicles belonging to non-residents, provisions of the
general statutes establishing the Kansas Board of Review for movie
censorship and provisions of the general statutes imposing certain
fees upon the movie industry. The argument that the single subject
of this act was repeal, and that therefore the act was constitutional,
was rejected and the act was held to deal with more than one sub66. One of the few Texas cases suggesting that an act contains more
than one subject is similar to the Waldron case; however, the act's title is
found misleading and the act is held invalid for that reason and so the court
does not really get to the plurality question. San Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex.
49 (1871).
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ject.8 7 The court considered the subject matter of the acts repealed
as the subject of the 1955 act for purposes of the one-subject rule.
As the subject matter of the acts repealed do not fall under one
general heading, the court's conclusion that the act dealt with more
than one subject seems sound. Important social and economic consequences can flow from the repeal as well as the enactment or
amendment of a law. Therefore, a court should be as sensitive to
the possibility of log-rolling in an act making repeals as in one enacting or amending a law.
Two Alabama cases and an earlier Kansas one involve acts containing certain substantive provisions and a repealer clause. The
early Alabama case found that the express repealer was a second
subject and that the act was therefore void08 The court does not
explain the contents of the two sections of the revised code which
were expressly repealed. The other Alabama case involved an act
providing for the form of government for cities with a population
between 50,500 and 100,000 by amending the existing law by,
among other things, changing the population bracket. One of the
effects of this change was to deprive towns and cities under 1,000
population and between 50,000 and 50,500 of the option of adopting
the commission form of city government. The court found that this
repeal was a second subject and that the act was therefore void.6
The Kansas case involved an act containing a number of provisions
concerning county government in Dickinson County and a section
repealing an act regulating the salaries of certain county officers in
Norton County. The court concluded that the act violated the onesubject rule, the repealer being a second subject.70 The two Alabama
cases seem doubtful. Repeal, in the abstract, is not a subject; the
subject matter of the acts repealed should be considered the subject
of the repealer. Only if the subject matter of the acts repealed was
distinct from that of the substantive provisions of the act is the
Weaver case sound. The repealed law in the Pillans case seems to
be on the same subject as the rest of the act - adoption of forms of
city government -and so the act should be held unconstitutional.
The repealer in the Snow case, however, does introduce a different
67. Kansas ex rel. Fatzer v. Shanahan, 178 Kan. 400, 286 P.2d 742

(1955).

68. Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224 (1869).
69. Pillans v. Hancock, 203 Ala. 570, 84 So. 757 (1919). It should be
noted that the court first declared the act void because it had a misleading and
uncertain title; thus, the determination that the act contained two subjects
may be considered as unnecessary to the decision.
70. Board of Comm'rs of Norton County v. Snow, 45 Kan. 332, 25 Pac.
903 (1891). The court also found the title defective; it indicated that the act
dealt only with Dickinson County.
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subject; the analysis made of the cases concerning two or more
named entities seems persuasive of this conclusion.
State v. Wright7' presents a related situation. An 1876 act incorporated the City of Astoria and granted it authority to issue liquor
and other licenses. An 1885 act regulated the sale of intoxicating
beverages, established the licensing procedure and fee, and provided
that no license may be granted by any city or town for less than $300
per year. Wright, who had a license from Astoria, was prosecuted
for selling intoxicating beverages without a license, the state contending that the 1885 act supersedes the Astoria ordinance insofar
as the ordinance fixes a different license fee. The court declared the
1885 act unconstitutional, finding, among other things, that the act
contained more than one subject. The court declared that if the act
were construed as the state argued it would affect every municipal
charter in the state and that an act which amends all municipal
charters in the state violates the one-subject rule.72 If the court
meant that the act is multi-subject because it affects every city in
the state, then the decision appears doubtful. 73 General legislation
dealing with the liquor traffic problem on a state-wide basis would
seem preferable to a number of acts dealing with it as it relates to
one or a few cities. The mischief at which the one-subject rule is
aimed is not present in the former but may be in the latter.
C. An Act Concerning Two Matters Treated Elsewhere in the Law
as Distinct Subjects.
Several cases have based their conclusion that the act in question
embraces more than one subject upon the fact that the jurisprudence
of the state considers several of the matters treated by the act as
separate, distinct subjects. This approach involves two assumptions:
(1) that some body of the state's jurisprudence for some purpose
considers the subjects as distinct and separate; and (2) that this
dichotomy is also applicable to the question at hand - compliance
with the one-subject rule.
Two cases have looked to provisions of -the constitution, found
that they classified certain matters dealt with by the act in question
71. 14 Ore. 365, 12 Pac. 708 (1887).
72. The common constitutional requirement that, "no act shall be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or amended
shall be set forth and published at full length" was relied upon in reaching
the conclusion that the act was unconstitutional. This seems a firmer basis
for the result. See, for example, Tex. Const. art. III, § 36 (1876).
73. Another defect of the act was that the title gave no notice that the
legislative charter of Astoria and other cities would be affected by the act.
In light of this defect and the act's failure to comply with constitutional rules
as to amendments, the court's conclusions on the one subject rule may not be
very important.
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as distinct, separate subjects, and then held the act void. A Louisiana case involved the validity of an act entitled, "an act prescribing
the manner of changing parish lines and of removing parish seats."
The Louisiana constitution provided, "all laws changing parish
lines or removing parish seats shall, before taking effect, be submitted. . .

."

The disjunctive "or" apparently convinced the court

that the constitution classified the changing of parish lines and the
removing of parish seats as distinct subjects.7 4 The disjunctive here
appears to be a slender reed indeed upon which to base the conclusion that the constitution classifies these two subjects as distinct.
The 'onclusion in an Illinois case, however, seems very sound. The
Illinois constitution expressly made one of the subjects dealt with
by the act in question a separate subject of legislation when it provided that acts appropriating money for certain salaries could deal
75

with no other subject.

Several cases have looked to past legislative practice in dealing
with the matters included in the bill under discussion and, finding
that there was a settled legislative practice of treating them separately, have declared the acts to contain more than one subject. A
New Jersey case found that the legislative practice for over thirty
years had been to treat taxation of steam railroads and taxation of
street railroads as separate subjects and that therefore an act combining both subjects violated the one subject rule.7 A Missouri case
found that the settled legislative practice was to classify railroads,
railroad property and railroad employees as separate from manufacturing, mechanical and mercantile establishments, their property
and employees and that therefore an industrial safety act applicable
to all was unconstitutional.7 7 While the title for both of these acts
may have been defective and the discussion of the one-subject rule
thus unnecessary, the two cases illustrate the approach. The onesubject rule is directed at log-rolling. It attacks log-rolling by striking down unnatural combinations of provisions in acts - those dealing with more than one subject - on the theory that the best
explanation for the unnatural combination is a tactical one - logrolling. The fact that the matters have always been dealt with separately in the past does suggest that the reason for their being com74. Moore v. Police Jury of Bosier Parish, 32 La. Ann. 1013 (1880).

75. Ritchie v. Illinois, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895). This case is discussed more fully in the section of this paper devoted to the constitutional
provisions dealing specially with acts appropriating money.
76. Atlantic City & S.R.R. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 88 N. J. Law 219,
96 AtI. 568 (1916).
77. Williams v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 233 Mo. 666, 136 S.W. 304

(1911).
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bined for the first time in one bill is log-rolling. To the extent that
this analysis is sound, the approach taken by these two cases seems
sound.
A related approach is that taken in a Pennsylvania case which
declared that an act embraced more than one subject because the
act treated two matters as separate subjects."8 While the court recognized that land surveying could be treated as a branch of engineering, the fact that the act regulated professional engineers and
land surveyors as separate callings induced the court to treat them
as separate subjects for purposes of the one subject rule. This seems
very doubtful reasoning.
Use has been made in a group of cases of the classification of
subjects in the law -the common law or the revised statutes -to
determine that the act in question embraces more than one subject.
An early Louisiana act entitled, "an act relative to slaves and free
colored persons," dealt with a wide range of matters in its ninetynine sections. Upon appeal by a slave from his conviction by a tribunal created by this act for killing another slave, it was held that
this act was unconstitutional. The court declared that the slave and
the free colored person are two classes which it is impossible to confound in legal parlance.79 Another Louisiana case involved an act
which made it a crime to make certain threats, these included threats
to commit nearly all the acts defined as crimes in 'the titles of the
statutes dealing with offenses against the person and against property. Because the act ranged across so many categories of crime, it
was found to embrace more than one subject.8 0 A Florida act condemned as a crime certain conduct which had been classed as arson
at common law and certain conduct which had not; this act was
viewed as embracing more than one subject.8 ' An Idaho act dealt
with the sale of general fund treasury notes and of state refunding
bonds; it was held that these were two subjects, the latter relating
to state indebtedness and the former not.

2

For purposes of consti-

tutional restrictions on state debt, the court was probably correct in
its classification. An Indiana act revised the laws relating to registration and regulation of motor vehicles and provided that the revenues from the inheritance tax shall be deposited in the general
78. See Commonwealth v. Humphrey, 288 Pa. 280, 136 Atl. 213 (1927).
The court holds the act unconstitutional because it employs an unreasonable
classification.
79. State v. Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722 (1856).
80. Louisiana v. Heywood, 38 La. Ann. 689 (1886).
81. William v. Florida, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186 (1930); Sawyer v.
Florida, 100 Fla. 1603, 132 So. 188 (1931). Again, an adequate basis for the
result in these two cases is that the title was misleading.
82. Idaho ex rel. Moore v. Banks, 37 Idaho 27, 215 Pac. 468 (1923).
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revenue fund. Viewing motor vehicles law and inheritance tax law
as separate subjects, the court held the act invalid. 3 The dissent
argued that history showed a pragmatic connection between these
matters and that the act should be considered valid; it was pointed
out that prior law dedicated a portion of the revenue from this tax
to highway purposes and that this act terminated this allocation. An
1863 Kentucky act dealt with appeals from justice and police courts
and with duties and fees of deputy clerks of the quarterly court;
with little explanation, this was classed as two subjects.84 An 1883
Michigan act provided for the incorporation of merchants mutual
insurance companies and for the regulation of insurance business
conducted by manufacturers mutual insurance companies. Viewing
the act, apparently, as dealing with the subjects of private corporations and of insurance, the court declared the act invalid.85 A Texas
act made the fraudulent taking of a chicken or turkey a felony or a
misdemeanor; declaring that a purpose of the one subject rule is to
prevent the combination of incongruous enactments, the court held
this act invalid.86 Plurality of subject does not seem to be the vice
of this act, rather it seems to be fatal ambiguity. 7 A Florida act
sought to compel tax returns to be filed by owners and custodians
of real and tangible personal property and provided that no deed
or bill of sale could be filed unless the post office address of the
grantee was given. This was viewed as dealing with recording acts
and with ad valorem taxation and to contain more than one subject.8 8 This conclusion was reached though it was argued by the
dissent that the purpose of the address requirement was to aid tax
enforcement and so this requirement was germane to tax provisions.
An Alabama act designated certain transfers by debtors of substantially all of their property to a creditor general assignments and
83. Jackson v. Indiana ex rel. South Bend Motor Bus Co., 194 Ind. 248,
142 N.E. 423 (1924).
84. Hind v. Rice, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 528 (1874).
85. Skinner v. Wilhelm, 63 Mich. 568, 30 N.W. 311 (1886).
86. Redding v. State, 109 Tex.Crim. 551, 6 S.W.2d 360 (1928). Ex parte
Wynn, 158 Tex.Crim. 665, 259 S.W.2d 191 (1953) applies the Redding case

to a similar statute.
87. Two other Texas cases dealing with the same statute should be noted
here. An act entitled, "an act to punish unlawful interference with private
property or private rights," which was enacted to check impressment of private property for public use, was declared to embrace more than one subject.

However, neither case explains its conclusion. State v. Shadle, 41 Tex. 404
(1874) ; Bills v. State, 42 Tex. 305 (1875).
88. Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, 100 Fla. 1349, 131 So. 178 (1930). The

severity of the sanction for failing to comply with the address requirement and
the fact that the inclusion of this provision in a tax act may conceal this may
have been influential here.
89. Builder's & Painters' Supply Co. v. Lucas, 119 Ala. 202, 24 So. 416
(1898).
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so made this property available to pay the claims of all creditors and
also prescribed penalties for persons conveying property in fraud of
creditors. Declaring that these were independent subjects, made separate and distinct by legislation, judicial decision and inherent character, the court held the act to be invalid.89
The unquestioning use of the classification of subjects in the
law as a basis for determining compliance with the one-subject rule
is, of course, unsound. Subjects are organized and classified as such
in the law for a variety of reasons- for reasons of history, legal
theory, convenience, functional relationships and the like. Not all of
the reasons are of the kind that indicate that any joining of subjects
in a single bill is most probably for log-rolling purposes. The approach of the Florida cases, for example, in looking at what was
arson at common law and what was not seems unsound. However,
it is said that the law is largely accumulated experience; as such, it
is a pretty practical guide as to what has a reasonable relationship
and what one of tactical convenience only.
D. An Act ConcerningFragments Only of a Subject.
A final group of cases have been examined where the various
provisions of an act all dealt with the same general subject, but the
individual provisions had no connection. A number of cases have
declared that an act may contain any number of subjects or topics
so long as they are all germane to each other or so long as they all
fall under one general heading. 90 A provision that introduces a topic
which is but a means for accomplishing the subject of the act does
not add a second subject.91 This points up that the one-subject rule
is not directed literally at plurality but at disunity of subject matter.
State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel expresses this position well:
[The one-subject rule does not] contemplate a metaphysical
singleness of idea or thing, but rather that there must be some
rational unity between the matters embraced in the act, the unity
being found in the general purpose of the act and the practical
problems of efficient administration.... matters which ordinarily
would not be thought to have any common features or character90. People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 281, 182 N.E. 439, 444 (1932) ; Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Rockwall County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 3,
117 Tex. 34, 297 S.W. 206 (1927) ; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577,
50 N.W. 923, 925 (1891).
91. Toole v. State, 170 Ala. 41, 54 So. 195 (1910). An unusual case is
Thomas v. State, 16 Ala. App. 145, 75 So. 821 (1917). In an act imposing
certain taxes to enable the construction of county roads, it was provided that
the draftsman of the act should obtain a certain per cent of the tax collected
for the first year as his compensation. The act was held to contain two subjects, though the provision for the draftsman's compensation could be viewed
merely as a means to accomplish the bill's general subject.
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istics may for purposes of legislative treatment, be grouped together and treated as one subject. For purposes of legislation,
'subjects' are not absolute existences to be discovered by some
sort of a priori reasoning, but are the result of classification for
convenience of treatment and for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose of the particular legislative act.'An Idaho case found that an act containing a variety of provisions relating to labor unions had no unity of purpose or core and
that the act was therefore void. 93 A Georgia act concerned election
returns for certain statewide offices and the term of office of these
officers. The court acknowledged that the two provisions related to
state officers but, finding no relationship between the two provisions,
held the act invalid.9 4 A Nebraska act contained amendments on a
variety of topics on the general subject of property law, but the court
could find no relationship among the topics and so held the act invalid. 95 It was argued that a New Mexico act dealt with the single
subject of betterment of state properties; however, the court found
that the subject was the capitol and its grounds and that the provisions concerning other state properties, including parks, elsewhere
had no connection to the first group of provisions." A 1927 Illinois
act established the debt limit for certain classes of municipalities and
prescribed the duties of the county clerk in the extension or scaling
of taxes. While it is admitted that these two provisions dealt with the
single subject of revenue, the court could find no connection between
the topics and so held the act invalid.9 7 The Louisiana case, mentioned earlier, which held invalid an act making it a crime to threaten
to commit a wide range of acts which acts are themselves a wide
range of crimes, could be considered as falling in this group of cases. 3
The rationale suggested for the preceding group of cases seems
applicable to this group. The absence of some common purpose or
other relationship between the specific topics treated in the act suggests that there were no practical, rational, and legitimate reasons
for combining the provisions in a single act. That suggests that the
provisions were combined only for tactical reasons, for purposes of
log-rolling. That being so the act is invalid.
92. 203 Ind. 457, 467-68, 180 N.E. 865, 868 (1932).
93. AFL v. Langley, 66 Idaho 763, 168 P.2d 831 (1946).
94. McGregor v. Clark, 155 Ga. 377, 116 S.E. 823 (1923).
95. Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N.W. 869 (1893). Among the
provisions of the act were ones giving the guardian of an insane wife the
power to convey her prospective property interests during her husband's lifetime, providing for the descent of realty, providing for the distribution of
personalty, providing for the disposition of homestead interests, and abolishing
the estates of dower and curtesy.
96. Johnson v. Greiner, 44 N.M. 230, 101 P.2d 183 (1940).
97. Michaels v. Hill, 328 Ill. 11, 159 N.E. 278 (1927).
98. State v. Heywood, 38 La. Ann. 689 (1886).
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VI.

ACTS SPECIALLY PRESENTING THE PLURALITY QUESTION

Before an evaluation is made of the one-subject rule, it seems
desirable to look at several types of acts which seem especially susceptible to the charge that they embrace more than one subject.
Considerable attention is given to acts appropriating money, especially general appropriation acts. This is explained by the fact that
eighteen states have special constitutional provisions concerning
these acts and that these acts have been the source of considerable
litigation on this score. Acts embodying codes or revisions of a substantial group of statutes and omnibus revenue acts will also be
examined.
A. Appropriation Acts
History tells us that the general appropriation bill presents a
special temptation for the attachment of riders. It is a necessary and
often popular bill which is certain of passage. If a rider can be
attached to it, the rider can be adopted on the merits of the general
appropriation bill without having to depend on its own merits for
adoption. Because this special temptation is yielded to from time to
time and because eighteen states have adopted constitutional provisions dealing specially with the contents of appropriation acts, it
seems wise to give considerable attention to the unity of subject
problem as it arises with respect to acts appropriating money. The
problem will be examined first in the context of the constitutional
provisions dealing specially with acts appropriating money and then
in the context of the general one-subject provisions.
Several factors in the enactment of a general appropriation act
may permit the attachment of a rider which may represent the point
of view of only a minority of the legislature. The sheer bulk of the
act itself may mean approval with no real attention being given to
the rider. In such a case the rider represents, in fact, the point of
view of no more than a majority of the committee. While the power
does exist in the house itself to remove these riders by a simple
majority vote, similar power does not exist in other circumstances.
For example, where the rider is attached by the conference committee, the houses of the legislature must accept or reject the whole
bill. The rider would have to be very obnoxious to induce a house
to reject the entire bill because it disapproves of a rider. The governor when he passes upon the bill must also accept or reject the
entire bill. While it is true that the constitutions of many states
permit the governor to disapprove individual items of appropriation
without disapproving the entire act, 99 this is generally held not to
99. E.g., Minn. Const. art. 4, § 11; Tex. Const. art. 4, § 14.
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include the power to disapprove provisions of the act which do not
make appropriations. 00 Arizona and Wisconsin, on the other hand,
do hold that their provisions grant the governor authority to veto
any separable portion of the appropriation act.' 0 '
In short, a substantial danger does' exist that the principle of
majority rule may be subverted in the general appropriation act.
This fact and the accumulated experience with appropriation acts
undoubtedly explains why eighteen states have adopted constitutional provisions specially dealing with the permissible contents of
acts making appropriations - both general appropriation acts and
other appropriation acts.' 0 2 Seven of these eighteen states expressly
except "general appropriation bills" from the operation of the onesubject rule and then go on to prescribe the permisible contents of
the general appropriation bills and to declare that all other 0appro3
priations shall be by separate bill embracing but one subject.
ConstitutiondProvisionsSummarized.
The most common form of the special provisions relating to the
contents of appropriation acts is that found in the Pennsylvania
constitution:
The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative
and judicial departments of the Commonwealth, interest on the
public debt and for public schools; all other appropriations shall
be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.' 0
The special provisions in the constitutions of Montana, North
Dakota, and Wyoming are identical, while those of Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, and Mississippi are substantially like the Pennsylvania provision. The New Mexico provision is substantially the
same as the Pennsylvania one but adds the phrase, "other expenses
required by existing law," to the list of items permitted in the gen100. Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499, 140 S.W. 405 (1911).
101. Callaghan v. Boyce, 17 Ariz. 433, 153 Pac. 773, 783 (1915) ; State
ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 260 N.W. 486 (1935). The
Wisconsin Court, after pointing out that the Wisconsin one-subject provision
applies only to local and private bills and that the Wisconsin constitution
grants authority to veto a "part" instead of an "item," reasoned that the governor's power of partial veto is co-extensive with the legislature's power to
include separable pieces of legislation in the appropriation act.
102. Table I lists the states having these provisions, gives the citations to
the constitution, and presents some data concerning the provisions. The eighteen states are Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Ill., Miss., Mont., Neb.,
N.M., N.D., Okla., Pa., S.D., W.Va., and Wyo.
103. Ala. Const. art. 4, § 45; Colo. Const. art. 5, § 21; Mont. Const.
art. 5, § 23; N.M. Const. art. 4, § 16; Okla. Const. art. 5, § 57; Pa. Const.
art. 3, § 3; Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24.
104. Pa. Const. art. 3, § 15.
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eral appropriation bill. The South Dakota provision is also substantially the same except that it adds the phrase, "the current expenses
of state institutions."'0 ° The Florida constitution seems also to state
a one-subject rule for appropriation bills, though in somewhat diferent terms. 08
The Illinois and Nebraska provisions impose greater limitations
on appropriation bills for certain purposes. The Illinois constitution
provides: "Bills making appropriations for the pay of members and
officers of the general assembly, and for the salaries of the officers
of the government, shall contain no provision on any other subject."'1 7 This requires that the bill making appropriations for salaries deals with only that matter; it imposes a greater limitation on
the legislature than would exist if the legislature were functioning
under just the general one-subject provision of the Illinois constitution. 108
The Alabama constitutional provision is like that of Pennsylvania with an important qualification; the legislature's power in
the general appropriation bill is limited by the following: "The salary of no officer or employe shall be increased in such bill, nor shall
any appropriation be made therein for any officer or employe unless
his employment and the amount of his salary have already been provided for by law." 10 9 Apparently, rather specific authority for all
appropriations must be found in general law. Oklahoma borrowed
its provision from Alabama. A somewhat similar limitation on the
legislature's power to make specific changes relating to government
administration is contained in the Georgia provision, where it is
declared:
The General appropriation bill shall embrace nothing except
appropriations fixed by previous laws, the ordinary expenses of
the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments of the Government, payment of the public debt and interest thereon, and
for support of the public institutions and educational interests
of the State. 10
The West Virginia Budget Amendment of 1917 goes far beyond
merely prescribing the permissible contents of bills appropriating
105. S.D. Const. art. 12, § 2. Interestingly, it requires that appropriations by separate bills must be enacted by a two-thirds vote of all the members
of each house.
106. Fla. Const. art. 3, § 30, "Laws making appropriations for the salaries of public officers and other currant [sic] expenses of the State shall contain provisions on no other subject."
107. Ill. Const. art. 4, § 16; Neb. Const. art. 3, § 22.
108. W. Va. Const. art. 6, § 42, is identical; but was replaced by the
more extensive provision, W. Va. Const art. 6, § 51, in 1917.
109. Ala. Const. art. 4, § 71.
110. Ga. Const. art. 3, § 7, para. 9.
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moneys. It establishes a Board of Public Works, composed of the
governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, attorney general,
superintendent of free schools, and commissioner of agriculture and
imposes upon it the duty to prepare a state budget and a budget bill.
The budget bill is divided into "governmental appropriations" and
"general appropriations," but no limit is placed upon the purposes
for which appropriations may be made in the budget bill.'" The
legislature may consider no other appropriation measure until the
budget bill is finally acted upon by both houses. Appropriation measures other than the budget bill are designated supplementary appropriation bills; these bills are "limited to some single work, object
or purpose therein stated.'
In 1922, California adopted a provision similar to the West Virginia Budget Amendment except that it imposes the duty to prepare
a budget and the budget bill upon the Governor."'3 There is no limit
on the subject matter of the proposed expenditures which may be
contained in the budget bill. A bill making appropriations, other
than the budget bill, however, may contain no more than one item
of appropriation and that for a single and certain purpose expressed
in the bill.
In addition to these eighteen states, there are four states in
which the general one-subject provision expressly excepts appropri114
tion bills from the constitutional rule.
It will be recalled that the general structure of the special constitutional provisions dealing with appropriations acts is to prescribe
the permissible contents of the general appropriation act and then to
limit all other acts making appropriations to one subject."15 Thus, in
111. State ex rel. Key v. Bond, 94 W. Va. 255, 118 S.E. 276 (1923),
declares that the general one-subject rule does not apply to appropriation
bills because they are governed by the Budget Amendment.
112. W. Va. Const. art. 6, § 51C(1).
113. Cal. Const. art. 4, § 34.
114. Del. Const. art. 2, § 16; Mo. Const. art. 3, § 23; Tex. Const. art.
3, § 35; Utah Const. art. 6, § 23. Of these four states Delaware grants the
broadest exception excepting "bills appropriating money for public purposes."
Utah excepts "general appropriation bills." Missouri and Texas except "general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts,
for and on account of which moneys are appropriated." The Missouri and
Texas constitutional provisions on their face make it clear that the exception
is technically not an exception but instead a declaration that the appropriation
bill deals with but one subject. While the constitutional provision in the other
two states, Delaware and Utah, expressly excepts general appropriation bills
from the one-subject rule, it seems that this exception amounts to no more
than a declaration that a general appropriation bill deals with but one subject.
Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 151 So. 858 (1934), so concludes with respect to the exception of "general revenue bill."
115. This is the structure of the provisions for all of the states listed in
note 102 except five. Florida simply limits laws making appropriations for current expenses of the state to that subject. Fla. Const. art. 3, § 30. Illinois and
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the construction of these special provisions, the first problem to be
solved is the determination of what may be included in the general
appropriation act.
GeneralAppropriationsAct.
Nine states designate as one of the permitted subjects in the
general appropriation act appropriations for "the ordinary expenses
of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government."116 A few cases develop what is an ordinary expense for purposes of this limitation. A Montana case decided that an appropriation for the payment of fire insurance premiums on insurance policies covering the state capitol and certain other state buildings was
an appropriation for an ordinary expense. "Any expense which recurs from time to time and is to be reasonably anticipated as likely
to occur in order for the proper operation and maintenance of the
departments of the state government is an ordinary expense."' 17 A
Colorado case declares that an appropriation to pay for the printing
of 3,000 copies of the state engineer's report for distribution to the
public would not be one for the ordinary expenses of the executive
department, though printing for the necessary and actual use of any
of the three departments of the government would be." 8 While the
court does not explain this classification, it apparently views this
educational effort on the part of a state agency as not a part of its
usual, ordinary function. The dissemination of information by a
state agency is apparently classed as an extraordinary activity. It is
very doubtful that the same result would be reached today; this
seems like an ordinary and important function of state government.
No discussion was found in the cases explaining the limitation
of "ordinary expenses." An apparent explanation is that the general
appropriation act should contain only those items which are usual
because the policy wisdom of these expenditures has already been
Nebraska provides that appropriations for the salaries of officers of the government and of members and officers of the general assembly shall deal with no
other subject. Ill. Const. art. 4, § 16; Neb. Const. art. 3, § 22. California and
Vest Virginia place no limit on the purposes for which appropriations may
be made in the general appropriation bill, the budget bill, but limit all other
bills making appropriations to one subject. Cal. Const. art. 4, § 34; W. Va.
Const. art. 6, § 51.
116. Ala., Ark., Colo., Ga., Miss., Mont., Pa., S.D., and Wyo.
117. Miller Ins. Agency v. Porter, 93 Mont. 567, 571-72, 20 P.2d 643,
645 (1933).
118. Collier & Cleaveland Lithographing Co. v. Henderson, 18 Colo.
259, 32 Pac. 417 (1893). There is dicta also in People ex rel. Richardson v.
Spruance, 8 Colo. 530, 9 Pac. 628 (1886), that an appropriation to a state
horticultural society constituted by law the Bureau of Horticulture to carry
out its duties could not be made in the general appropriation act, but the reason for this is not stated.
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decided; that is, there is no substantial question as to whether expenditures should be made for these purposes. Therefore, these
appropriations need not depend upon their association with the necessary appropriations for adoption but are acceptable on their own
merits. Appropriations, however, for new or unusual projects have
not, by definition, been tested and found legislative acceptance. To
permit them to be included in the bill is to permit them to gain
approval, in some cases, as a result of the reflected glory flowing
from being a part of an act providing the usual and necessary appropriations. The purpose of the limitation under discussion, then, is
to make new proposals for expenditures gain acceptance on their
own merit." 9 The underlying assumption is that there is a continuity
in legislative policy -that when the legislature has for a number of
years decided to expend money for a given purpose this decision has
become a part of permanent policy. All that remains to be done each
time the legislature appropriates is to decide "how much" and not
"whether."
If the purpose of the limitation is that suggested here, then
whether a particular item may be included depends upon whether
it has been previously included a sufficient number of times so that
its inclusion has become a permanent policy. Is not one way of defining ordinary that which has occurred often enough to become
usual ?
Three states designate as one of the permitted subjects of the
general appropriation act appropriations for "the expenses of the
executive, legislative and judicial department."' 20 Arizona lists this
permitted subject simply as appropriations for "the different departments of the state." It seems that these four provisions add up to
the same thing - the appropriations are not limited to those for an
ordinaryexpense, but they must be for one of the three departments
of government.
What is an appropriation for "interest on the public debt" and
for the "public schools" seems not to have been litigated. There
would seem to be few debatable questions concerning what constitutes an appropriation for "interest on the public debt." If the debt
is one which the state may assume, then it would seem to be public.
What constitutes interest presents no real question. There may be
a question whether "public schools" means public free schools or
includes public institutions of higher learning as well. The answer
119. Substantially this rationale is given for another type of limitation
on appropriation bills by Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 319, 110 N.E. 130, 137

(1915).
120.

N.M., N.D., and Okla.

ONE-SUBJECT RULE

to this would have to be worked out for each state in light of the
history of the appropriate constitutional provisions and of the public
education program and of the practical construction given to the
constitution. South Dakota uses the term "common schools" instead
of "public schools." It would seem that this term does not include
colleges and universities and so this question may not exist in South
Dakota.
There may also be some question whether the appropriations
must be ordinary or usual expenditures for public school purposes.
A textual interpretation can be made to the effect that there is no
such limit because the fact that such a limit is expressly imposed on
the appropriations for the expenses of the three branches of government, and is not imposed on the item being discussed indicates that
there is no such limitation intended on public school appropriations.
The narrow view could be taken that appropriations for the expenses of state administration of the public free school program is
not an appropriation for "public schools" as it does not go directly
into the local school program, but this seems to be a mechanical and
unrealistic view.
One may wonder why it was necessary to mention this subject
of appropriation at all; it seems to be an ordinary expense of the
executive department. Perhaps the constitutional provision reflects
the thinking of a number of educators who consider education the
fourth department of state government.
The significance of the added phrase, "other expenses required
by existing law," in the New Mexico provision has not been suggested in any reported opinion. Prima facie, it seems that most
appropriations referred to by this phrase are appropriations for
"ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial departments." If the interpretation of "ordinary expenses" suggested earlier is correct, it may be that the phrase under discussion would
permit the inclusion of appropriations being made for the first time
which otherwise would have to be made by a special appropriation
bill. When is an expense "required" by a law? When a law requires
an officer or agency to carry out a certain program? Or must the
law not only require a certain program but rather specifically require
the item of expenditure? To the extent that the answer to this question is in terms of a specific legislative mandate the phrase under
discussion would seem to add nothing. If the rationale of the "ordinary expense" rule is as suggested, then the specific legislative mandate could be considered the decision which makes the expense an
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"ordinary" one and so authorized by the earlier phrase in the
constitution.
The South Dakota provision lists as one of the permissible subjects of appropriation in the general appropriation act those for "the
current expenses of state institutions." While the Supreme Court of
South Dakota has not passed on the question, it seems safe to conclude that any appropriation within this phrase would also be an
appropriation for "ordinary expenses of the executive department."
Thus, this additional phrase seems redundant. It nmay have been
added, out of abundant caution, because appropriations for this purpose represent in most states one of the major items of expenditure.
The Florida provision limits the general appropriation act to
appropriations for "current expenses of the state." This seems to do
little more than limit the appropriation act to appropriations; the
general one-subject provision of the constitution would seem to do
that. However, it may be that significance should be given to "current" so as to place a limit in terms of time on the objects of appropriations. Thus, it may be that appropriations to pay claims against
the state are not for "current expenses" and so must be made by a
special appropriation act. Because a tort or contract claim grows out
of some past event, an appropriation to pay such a claim may be
considered not to accomplish some objective of the current fiscal
year. What limitation upon appropriations acts is imposed by this
provision of the Florida constitution has not been explored in reported cases.
The Alabama and Oklahoma constitutions place severe limitations upon what the general appropriations act may do with respect
to the salaries of officers and employees. It has been held that these
limitations apply only to general appropriations bills and not special
ones. 12' No reported case deals with the question of what amounts
to an increase in the salary of an officer or employee; thus whether
an increase in a per diem travel allowance or in a food or housing
allowance'is an increase in salary cannot be answered on the basis
of the cases. It would seem that any reimbursement for expenses
incurred in order to carry out duties owed the state would not be
payment of salary, but that all other payments arising out of the
office or employment would be. The limitation-that an appropriation
for the salary of an officer or employee tpay not be made unless his
employment and the amount of his salary has already been provided
for by law has been dealt with by the Oklahoma court. The purpose
121. Bryan v. Menefee, 21 Okla. 1 ,95 Pac. 471 (1908) ; see State cx
rel. Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okla. 32, 40, 27 P.2d 617, 624-25 (1933).
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of this requirement of previous law is said to be to reduce the pressure for increased expenditures. 122 The appropriations for salaries
of the necessary and required officers and for other expenses have
very vigorous and effective support. If this support could be used
in behalf of new positions and increased salaries for old ones, the
pressure for increased expenditures could be very considerable. This
constitutional provision prevents the combination of political pressure
through the general appropriation act. Because the evil does not
exist where the new position is provided for or salaries raised in a
separate appropriation bill explains why the constitutional limitation is held not to apply to such a bill. The 1933 Oklahoma general
appropriation act contained the item, "Public Utilities - Appraisal,
Audit and Litigation $50,000." In an original action for a mandamus
to compel the state auditor to audit and allow certain claims for
salaries out of this appropriation, the court held that salaries of
accountants, engineers, clerks and stenographers of the Corporation
Commission could be paid out of this item if their employment and
the amount of their salary was provided by previous law.1 22a The
constitutional limitation was held applicable to special as well as
regular employees. A provision of the Oklahoma constitution generally charging the Commission with responsibility for utility regulation was found to authorize the Commission to carry out its duties
by employing experts, which includes accountants, engineers, clerks
and stenographers. This authority by implication also gave the
Commission authority to fix the salaries for such employees, which
the Commission had done by its order. Thus, the requirement of
previous law authorizing the employment and setting the salary was
found to have been met. This case indciates that the constitutional
limitation is not strict; it does not require specific previous law.
General authority seems to be enough, at least where the agency
concerned has then set the salary by its order.
Illinois and Nebraska provide that acts making appropriations
for the salaries of officers and members of the general assembly and
of officers of the government may contain no other subject. This
means, of course, that appropriations for these purposes may not be
included in the general appropriation act. The amount of these salaries are fixed, and the salaries must be paid; this factor of necessity
and the natural interest of the legislator in these appropriations
means that an act containing these appropriations will most certainly be enacted. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to
122. Bryan v. Menefee, 21 Okla. 1, 10, 95 Pac. 471, 475 (1908).
122a. State ex rel. Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okla. 32, 27 P.2d 617 (1933).
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prevent combining other appropriations and matters with these
appropriations so as to gain more certain and ready adoption of the
other matters. 12 3
In Fergusv. Russel 2 4 an assistant attorney general in charge of
the inheritance tax office in Cook County was held to be one of the
"officers of the state government" so that the appropriation to pay
his salary in the general appropriations was invalid. The court concluded that the remainder of the act was not affected by the invalidity of this appropriation. Where there is an admixture of provisions in violation of this constitutional provision, the court declares
that the provisions concerning the dominant purpose of the bill will
be held valid and the other provisions held invalid. Concluding that
the officer's salary appropriation was included in the bill through an
error as to who is an officer, the court determined that the remainder
of the act embodied its dominant purpose and so should be given
effect and that this salary appropriation should be held invalid. The
dominant purpose test to determine severability may not be sound.
If the appropriations constituting a minor purpose of the act were
sufficient to invite a significant number of votes for the measure,
then the evil of log-rolling at which the constitutional provision is
aimed may be potentially present. If that circumstance exists, then
the entire act should be held invalid. The dominant purpose test
should be used very sparingly, if at all.
Hibbard v. Cornel1125 illustrates a literally correct but substantively erroneous application of this constitutional provision, A Nebraska act regulated certain food products, including imitation dairy
products, created a food commission to carry out the regulation,
created the office of deputy food commissioner, and made an appropriation to pay, among other things, his salary. The appropriation
to pay his salary was held invalid as an appropriation of an officer's
salary. While this appropriation is within the literal limifation of the
constitution, it is very doubtful that the appropriation falls within
the mischief at which the limitation is aimed. Combining the appropriation for this officer's salary with the other provisions of the bill
very probably did not aid in the enactment of the bill. As this act
created the office, there could be no officer at the time of the act's
passage and there could be neither any pressure from the officer and
his political friends nor any legal necessity to pass the appropriation.
In fact, it is quite likely that the entire appropriations section of the
123. Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 319, 110 N.E. 130, 137 (1915) ; Rein
v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 82, 30 N.W.2d 548, 557 (1947).
124. 270 Ill. 304, 320, 110 N.E. 130, 137 (1915).
125. State ex rel. Hibbard v. Cornel, 60 Neb. 276, 83 N.W. 72 (1900).
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act was the bitter medicine which the sponsors needed to convince
the legislature to take in order to get the benefits alleged for the
substantive program. To the extent that this analysis is sound, acts
like the one involved in the Cornell case should be found to fall outside the constitutional limitation.
Thirteen state constitutions declare that the "general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations"for designated
1 27
purposes. 126 Three more provide substantially the same rule,
and two limit bills making certain appropriations to that subject
alone. 128 These provisions naturally raise the question of what, for
these purposes, is an appropriation.
No court has applied these constitutional limitations in a strict,
literal sense; the appropriations act is not limited to a bare statement of the amounts appropriated and the purposes or objects of the
appropriation. Provisions that are an incidental and necessary regulation of the expenditure of the money appropriated may be included.121, It has been said that the appropriation act may contain
appropriations of money for specific purposes and such other provisions as are merely incidental and necessary to seeing that the money
appropriated is properly expended for the purposes designated ;130
or such other matters which are germane to and naturally and logically connected with the expenditure of the moneys provided in the
bill, being in the nature of a detail.181
The following provisions have been held to be proper, incidental,
and necessary regulations: a provision limiting reimbursement for
lodging and subsistence to $5 per day ;132 a provision authorizing the
employment of a clerk in the office of the prothonotaries of the supreme court and appropriating moneys to pay his salary ;133 a provision authorizing the issuance of certificates of indebtedness to
provide funds for the payment of the appropriation made in two
preceding sections of the act for the payment of certain deficiencies
134
and for the construction of certain buildings.
126. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Colo., Ga., Miss., Mont., N.M., N.D., Okla.,
Pa., S.D., and Wyo.
127. Cal., Fla., and W. Va.
128. II. and Neb.
129. Caldwell v. Board of Regents, 54 Ariz. 404, 96 P.2d 401 (1939);
State ex rel. Whittier v. Safford, 28 N.M. 531, 214 Pac. 759 (1923) ; Trotter
v. Frank P. Gates & Co., 162 Miss. 569, 139 So. 843 (1932).
130. State v. Angle, 54 Ariz. 13, 91 P.2d 705 (1939).
131. Caldwell v. Board of Regents, 54 Ariz. 404, 96 P.2d 401 (1939).
132. State ex rel. Whittier v. Safford, 28 N.M. 531, 214 Pac. 759 (1923).
133. Commonwealth ex rel. Greene v. Gregg, 161 Pa. 582, 29 AtI. 297

(1894).

134. State ex rel. Lucero v. Marron, 17 N.M. 304, 128 Pac. 485 (1912).
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The following provisions have been held to be improper: a rider
declaring that both husband and wife may not be included on the
payrolls mentioned in the act and thus establishing a new general
qualification for state employees paid by authority of the general
appropriation act ;135 a provision making certain comptroller's warrants and treasurer's certificates receivable for all except designated
state dues ;1" a provision that certain items appropriated were to be
expended only by and with the approval of the governor ;127 a provision that all receipts of the State Corporation Commission, including all receipts of the insurance department of the state, shall
hereafter be covered into the State Salary Fund ;138 and a provision
which either attempted to create a new state office or to legislate
one person out of office and to put another in. 3 9
The provisions held invalid as contravening the constitutional
limitation were characterized as an attempt to establish a permanent
policy by appropriation rider, 40 as an attempt to confer authority
which previously did not exist,' and as an attempt to enact general
legislation.142
A related attack upon riders in the general appropriation act is
that the rider conflicts with general law or that it attempts to repeal
a general law. Where the subject of the rider is not sufficiently connected with appropriations to permit its inclusion in an appropriations act, the rider would be invalid, in any case, whether it
conflicted with general law or not. 43 Several cases involve conflicts
where the general law deals with a subject appropriate to an appropriation bill; these cases clearly raise the question whether the fact
of conflict with a general law alone is enough to invalidate the
appropriation provision.
In State v. Angle,'4" the general appropriation act specified the
salaries for certain state employees. Acting under authority of a
135.
136.

(1872).

Caldwell v. Board of Regents, 54 Ariz. 404, 96 P.2d 401 (1939).
In the Matter of the 3d Section of Appropriation Bill, 14 Fla. 283

137. State ex re. Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okla. 32, 27 P2d 617 (1933
138. State ex rel. Delgado v. Sargent, 18 N.M. 131, 134 Pac. 218 (1913
139. People ex rel. Fulton v. O'Ryan, 71 Colo. 69, 204 Pac. 86 (1922).
140.' State ex tel. Delgado v. Sargent, 18 N.M. 131, 134 Pac. 218 (1913).
141. State ex rel. Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okla. 32, 27 P.2d 617 (1933).
142. Caldwell v. Board of Regents, 54 Ariz. 404, 96 P.2d 401 (1939).
143. Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P.2d 666 (1933), involves a
provision of the 1933 general appropriation act providing that no expenditure
could be made by certain agencies for operation or travel out of the amounts
appropriated until approval was granted by the governor. This changed the
previous law; under it the governor had no duty to pass upon these expenditures. The court held the provision invalid as legislation in a general appropriation bill. It was also contrary to the previous general law; and so the
rider would seem to be void on two grounds.
144. 54 Ariz. 13, 91 P.2d 705 (1939).
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previous general law, the Highway Commision had fixed minimum
wages for these employees in excess of the amounts specified in the
general appropriation act. In a suit brought against the state to
recover the difference between the amount paid and the minimum
fixed, it was held that the general appropriation act was ineffective
as a repeal of the minimum wage law, a general law, and that these
state employees were entitled to judgment for the difference. The
appropriation act may properly set the salaries or maximum salaries to be paid employees under the act; therefore, absent the conflict
with the minimum wage law, the appropriation act here would have
been effective to fix the wages. Thus, the fact that the subject is
treated by an existing general law is alone enough to prevent its
treatment in the general appropriation act.
Callaghanv. Boyce, an earlier Arizona case not cited in Angle,
may appear inconsistent. The general appropriation act there contained an item for the salary of the citizen member of the Board of
Control and also declared that paragraph 4460 of the Civil Code
was repealed. Paragraph 4460 was an annual continuing appropriation for the salary of this officer and other purposes.1 45 The court
held that, while the express repealer was ineffective as to subjects
other than that contained in the item of which the repealer was a
part, the repealer was effective as to the salary of the citizen member. Essentially, the question was whether the appropriation for the
citizen member's salary in paragraph 4460 or in the general appropriation act is the legal appropriation. Normally, the later act is the
law, unless the legislature lacks the power to adopt it. As the general
appropriation act seems in this particular to be within the constitutional limitation that it "embrace nothing but appropriations," there
would seem to be no lack of power. In addition, to hold that a permanent appropriation law, one making a continuing appropriation,
cannot be replaced by a provision in a general appropriation act
would very seriously interfere with and impede the normal biennial
appropriation process.
The rationale of a West Virginia case1 6 is inconsistent with the
Angle case. An 1882 law provided that the secretary of state may
spend no more than $1,100 per year for clerk hire. The subsequently
adopted general appropriation act of 1882 appropriated more than
$1,100 for this purpose. In a suit testing the right of a clerk to her
145. It should be noted that the constitutions of a number of states do
not permit continuing appropriations. Texas, for example, provides that no
appropriation may be made for a longer term than two years. Tex. Const. art.

8, § 6.
146. State ex rel. Key v. Bond, 94 W. Va. 255, 118 S.E. 276 (1923).
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salary, it was held, in effect, that the subsequent appropriation act
repealed by implication the prior 1882 law 147 and that the clerk was
entitled to be paid in accordance with the general appropriation act.
If the correct rule is that mere conflict with general law invalidates
the appropriation provision, then this case is wrong; it gives effect
to a conflicting appropriation provision. It should be noted that the
general law here establishes a maximum for future appropriations
for a given purpose; this is an interference with future legislatures'
exercise of the very essence of the appropriation power - the determination of how much shall be spent for a purpose already authorized by general law. The court, in this case, holds that a general law
shall not so interfere with the appropriation process. Also, isn't the
appropriation act well within the limitation that it "embrace nothing
but appropriations" in this case?
It should be noted that all these cases involve provisions in the
general appropriations act making appropriations and not regulating
appropriations made. It is also noteworthy that in none of the three
cases did the court hold the appropriations item ineffective to make
the appropriation.
Special Appropriation Acts.
After describing the permissible contents of the general appropriation act, the constitutions of eleven states declare that "all other
appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but
one subject." 48 The South Dakota provision is identical except that
it speaks of "object" instead of "subject." The substance of the New
Mexico provision is the same, although it omits the final clause. California declares that bills, other than the budget bill, making appropriations shall contain no more than one item of appropriation and
that limited to one single and certain purpose expressed in the bill.
West Virginia limits the supplementary appropriation bill "to some
single work, object or purpose therein stated." These constitutional
provisions raise the question of what is a subject, work, object or
purpose, as the case may be, for purposes of these provisions.
The first question that arises is whether the special appropriation
act may contain more than one item of appropriation. Only the California constitution speaks directly to this question; it limits acts
making appropriations, other than the budget bill, to "one item of
147. The court reasoned that as the 1882 law was not to take effect until
90 days after its passage and as the 1882 general appropriation act took effect
immediately upon passage and before these 90 days had expired, the 1882 law
was prevented from taking effect as law. Subsequent general appropriation
acts in conflict with the 1882 law continued this ban on it becoming law.
148. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Colo., Ga., Miss., Mont, N.D., Okla., Pa., and
Wyo.

ONE-SUBJECT RULE

appropriation." This somewhat mechanical rule has been enforced
to the letter. Thus, a special appropriation act containing two items
of appropriation, both serving the same purpose-the encouragement of the cultivation of ramie in the state, was held to violate
the constitutional provision.149 However, the California courts have
permitted the legislature to indicate the different objects or subpurposes for which the one item of appropriation shall be expended.
Thus, a 1944 act which appropriated ten million dollars for a matching grant-in-aid program of public works to be engaged in by cities
and counties in the prevention and relief of unemployment which
may follow the end of World War II and which then prescribed that
seven million of this be used as the state's share of the costs of preparing plans, nearly three million for the state's share of costs of
acquiring sites and rights of way, and about $100,000 for the administrative costs to certain state departments was held not to violate
the constitutional limitation. 150 The court concluded that neither the
singleness of the appropriation item nor the singleness or certainty
of the express purpose were violated. The court declared that the
fact that the amount appropriated is to be spent in installments or
for subsidiary objects looking to the execution of the primary purpose of the act does destroy the singleness of item of appropriation
or of purpose. It would seem that any other construction by the
California court would require the legislature to make its special
appropriations either in a lump sum which delegated very considerable discretion to the agency with little meaningful fiscal guidance from the legislature or by a number of separate bills for each
purpose. Either alternative is undesirable.
Apart from California, however, it seems clear that the special
appropriation act may contain more than one item of appropriation;
that is, there may be more than one amount of money appropriated."," Of course, the various items must all relate to one subject,
object, or purpose.
An Alabama case declares that special appropriation acts may
contain nothing but appropriations. 2 However, all of the other
149. Murray v. Colgan, 94 Cal. 435, 29 Pac. 871 (1892). Westinghouse
Elec. and Mfg. Co. v.Chambers, 169 Cal. 131, 145 Pac. 1025 (1915), manifests the same approach.
150. Los Angeles v. Post War Pub. Works Review Bd., 26 Cal.2d 101,
156 P.2d 746 (1945).
151. Miller Ins. Agency v.Porter, 93 Mont. 567, 20 P.2d 643 (1933);
Winter v.Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933) ; Hill v.Rae, 52 Mont.

378, 158 Pac. 826 (1916).
152. Woolf v.Taylor, 98 Ala. 254, 13 So. 688 (1893). This seems to be

merely dicta; the court held that the title
did not express the subject of the
appropriation and that itshould have. See also Trotter v. Frank P. Gates &
Co., 162 Miss. 569, 139 So. 843 (1932).
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cases found declare that special appropriation acts are not limited
to making appropriations; or to put it more accurately, an act other
than a general appropriation act may make an appropriation without
being limited merely to appropriating. For example, an act creating
a farm loan department, prescribing the conditions for obtaining
a loan, and otherwise outlining the loan program could also make
an appropriation for administrative expenses and for the guaranty
fund for the program. 53 An act establishing a system of uniform
grading of certain agricultural products, creating the state agency
to administer the program, imposing duties upon certain state
officers, and imposing sanctions for violation of the act could also
make an appropriation for salaries of the officers and employees
engaged in the program. 54 An act regulating the use of motor
vehicles, providing for their registration, and providing for licensing
of drivers may also dedicate the license and registration fees to the
construction, maintenance, and repair of the state highways. 15 If
the appropriation is but an incident to the single subject of the
act, then the inclusion of the appropriation does not violate the
constitutional provision. 15 6 If the appropriation is the means by
which the purpose of the act is carried out, the appropriation does
not destroy the singleness of subject.157 An act which creates a state
agency and defines its program may contain an appropriation for its
operation.'5 8 The disposition of money raised by a tax or fee is
clearly germane to the subject of the tax and so is an appropriation
to administer the tax. 55
An Illinois case deserves special comment. An act regulating the
conditions of employment in manufacturing establishments, setting
maximum hours for women and minors, and establishing the administrative machinery also contained an appropriation to pay the salaries of the factory inspectors authorized in the act. While the court
seems to say that this appropriation introduces a second subject,
the real obstacle for this appropriation seems to be the fact that these
inspectors are officers and the Illinois constitution provides that
bills containing appropriations for the salaries of officers of the
government shall contain no'provision on any other subject.81 The
153. Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 Pac. 826 (1916).
154. State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 164 N.W. 924 (1917).
155. Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Powell, 249 Pa. 144, 94 Atl. 746

(1915).

156.
P.2d 515
157.
158.
286 P.2d
159.
160.

State ex tel. Blume v. State Board of Education, 97 Mont. 371, 34
(1934) (dictum).
Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332 (1926).
Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 Pac. 826 (1916); Rupe v. Shaw,
1094 (Okla. 1955).
Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933).
Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895).
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court concludes that this provision of the constitution makes appropriations for salaries of officers a subject so that the inclusion of
other material adds a second subject. Except for this constitutional
determination that such an appropriation is a subject, the court
seemed willing to conclude that the appropriation was germane to
the regulatory provisions of the act and so not a separate subject.
Thus, unlike the general appropriation acts, the special or supplementary appropriation acts are not limited to making appropriations. As pointed out earlier, even the general appropriation act
may contain more than just the items of appropriations; the subject
appropriations is broader than just the items of appropriations.
This being so, of course, the special appropriation acts may contain
those provisions in addition to the items of appropriation which are
proper to be included in a general appropriation act. That is, provisions which set out the conditions upon which the money appropriated may be drawn from the treasury and the machinery for
administering the funds may be included in any special appropriation
act.""1 Provisions of this kind would be proper even in those jurisdictions which would limit the special appropriation acts to making
appropriations.
State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly'62 concerns an act regulating the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of intoxicating liquor, imposing
license fees and taxes, and appropriating certain funds derived from
the license fees to the use of the Liquor Control Commission and the
Department of Justice and Public Safety. The appropriation to the
department was not limited to paying the expenses of its enforcement of this liquor control act. Because the act contained affirmative
regulatory provisions of a permanent character, the act could not be
considered a general appropriation act; therefore, the act is a special
appropriation act which is required to be limited to one object.

63

As the appropriation is not limited to expenses of administration of
liquor regulation, the act is not for a single object or purpose. The
court then concluded that the attempted appropriation was void
and prohibited the disbursement of funds under the act for the support of the Department.
A Colorado bill providing for the levy of a tax and then separate
appropriations of the revenues for each of the following institutions,
161. Booth & Flinn, Ltd. v. Miller, 237 Pa. 297, 85 Atl. 457 (1912);
Trotter v. Frank P. Gates & Co., 162 Miss. 569, 139 So. 843 (1932).
162. 65 S.D. 345, 274 N.W. 319 (1937), 23 Iowa L. Rev. 131.
163. It will be recalled that South Dakota uses "object" instead of "sub-

ject." In the Kelly case, the court declared that "subject" is the matter of
public or private concern for which the law is enacted, while "object" is the

aim or purpose of an act. The court concludes that "object" is used in this
provision of the constitution in the sense of "purpose."
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the agricultural school, the state school of mines, the state normal
school, and the state institutes for the mute and the blind, was held to
deal with more than one subject.'6 4 Because the bill contained a permanent levy of the tax it could not be classed as a general appropriation act; nothing of a permanent nature can be included in such an
act. The court concluded that the appropriation for each of the four
institutions each constitute a separate and distinct purpose that
should be made to depend for its passage or defeat solely upon its
own merits. The court assumed that each of the four institutions
were educational and yet classed the appropriations to each as a
separate subject. It may be questioned whether this is not a too
narrow reading of "subject."' 165 The fact that this was an advisory
opinion dealing with a bill under consideration and not a decision
concerning an act already adopted may have affected the result. The
court knew that no program would be totally disrupted by its
decision; the legislature could take its final action to conform to the
constitutional requirements as seen by the court. It is noteworthy
that this and the Kelly case are the only reported decisions from
these eighteen states finding a special appropriation act to contain
more than one subject of appropriation.
With this differentiation between what a general appropriation
act may contain and what other acts making appropriations may
contain, it becomes important to determine what "the general appropriation bill" is. Is this a single bill? Can there be more than one
general appropriation bill for each appropriation period-fiscal year
or biennium? A common practice is to pass one omnibus bill making
appropriations for all of the state programs. There may be additional bills, but they are narrow in scope. Some states have used four
general appropriations bills-one each for the judiciary, legislature,
executive departments and agencies, and education. The two cases
which have addressed themselves to the question declare that the
legislature is not limited to passing one general appropriation act. 6
The Colorado House Bill 168 could not be classified as a general
appropriation bill because it contained a permanent levy of a tax and
164. In re House Bill 168, 21 Colo. 46, 39 Pac. 1096 (1895).
165. A Pennsylvania act containing a special appropriation to the welfare department to be paid by it to named hospitals at the rate of $3 per day
for services rendered to persons entitled to the service free of charge was
held to deal with only a single subject of legislation. The fact that two or
more hospitals may be reimbursed does not destroy the singleness of subject.
Constitutional Defense League v. Waters, 309 Pa. 545, 164 Atl. 613 (1932).
166. See In re Hotuse Bill 168, 21 Colo. 46, 39 Pac. 1096 (1895) ; State
ex rel. McDonald v. Holmes, 19 N.D. 286, 123 N.W. 884, 886 (1909). State
ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 351, 274 N.W. 319, 322-23 (1937), seems
to admit that there may be more than one general biennial appropriations act.
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so had to be treated as a special appropriation act. If it had not
contained the imposition of the tax in a temporary or permanent
form, it could have been classified as a general appropriation act
and held valid. If it is held that there can be only one general appropriation bill for each appropriation period, then all other bills making
appropriations are special and must be confined to appropriations for
one subject. But if more than one general appropriation bill is permitted, it becomes difficult to determine whether a particular bill
is a general or special appropriation bill. As the Colorado case
illustrates, however, the question becomes crucial only as to those
bills which contain only appropriations but which make appropriations for several different objects or purposes. If such a bill is considered a general one, then it is valid, but if not it is invalid because
it embraces more than one subject.
There may be and probably should be no mechanical answer
to this question. Where there is more than one major act containing
appropriations, it would seem that all of the appropriations acts
should have some unity. Thus, an act making appropriations for the
various institutions of higher education or for the various state
hospitals and special schools comprising the state's eleemosynary
institutions is properly classed as a general appropriation act. There
is a unity in such an act. However, one containing appropriations for
the operation of the insurance department, the barbers' licensing
board, the watermelon marketing program, the district attorney's
salary for the 30th district, and the interim legislative committee on
atomic energy would seem not to be a general act. The mischief of
combining diverse interests in a single bill seems, on the face of the
bill, to exist in this measure. It does not seem to be a coordinated
approach to the financial support for all of some segment of the
state program; to be a general appropriation bill it would seem that
it should deal with all or substantially all of some segment of state
activity, such as public free schools, higher education, or the
judiciary.
On several occasions courts have been called upon to decide
whether an act dedicating or earmarking the revenue from a particular source was thereby making an appropriation so that the act fell
under the one-subject requirement applicable to special appropriation acts. An Alabama case held that a provision designating into
two funds the revenue from the tax imposed by the act did not make
an appropriation. 1 7 As the purposes served by the two funds were
quite different, appropriations for the two purposes probably could
167. Nachman v. State Tax Comm'n, 233 Ala. 628, 173 So. 25 (1937).
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not be joined in a single special bill. However, the act apparently
only earmarked the revenues for the two funds; other legislation
granted the authority to make expenditures from the funds for
the designated purpose, that is, made the appropriations. A Pennsylvania case declared that the appropriation acts provision of the constitution does not apply to an act creating a fund for a special, described purpose and dedicating revenues to the fund. 6 s In this
case, however, the purposes served by the fund and the other provisions of the act could easily be grouped under the one general subject of highways. Thus, even had the earmarking been considered
an appropriation there would have been singleness of subject.
A 1943 South Dakota act, popularly called the tithing law, provided that ten per cent of the gross receipts of eighteen designated
boards and commissions, mostly licensing boards, should be transferred each year to the general revenue fund. In response to the
argument that this was a special appropriation act containing more
than one object, the court decided that the act was not an appropriations act as it did not authorize the disbursement of public funds.'6 5
This is true even though its effect is to reduce by ten per cent the
continuing appropriations of the agencies affected. The court does
not deal with the question whether this act violates the general
one-subject rule of the South Dakota Constitution, but, as suggested below, there seems to be a single subject.
The Alabama and South Dakota cases seem sound. The subject of the Alabama act, for example, seems to be taxation of retail
stores and not homesteads and education-the objects of the dedicated funds. As the tax question presents a single general subject,
the evils at which the constitutional provision is aimed do not seem
to be present. While taxation itself has certain regulatory effects, it
is not imposed just to get revenue, but to get revenue to carry on
some governmental program. Should this purpose for which the tax
is imposed be considered as introducing an additional subject or
subjects? If so, then there is duplicity in almost every tax bill. While
a legislator's interest in a particular tax measure may depend upon
his enthusiasm for the need for the measure, it would seem that the
log-rolling evil is not substantially present.
168. Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Powell, 249 Pa. 144, 94 Att. 746
(1915). It has been argued that the Powell case holds that the appropriation
acts provision applies only to appropriations from general revenues. While
that statement is contained in the opinion, the context in which it appears
would seem not to justify such a sweeping statement as the court's holding.
State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 352, 274 N.W. 319, 323 (1937),
rejects this suggested limitation of the constitutional provision and holds that
it applies to all appropriations, whatever the source of the funds appropriated.
169. State ex rel. Parker v. Youngquist, 69 S.D. 423, 11 N.W.2d 84
(1943).
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The South Dakota provision requiring special appropriation acts
to be enacted by a two-thirds vote of all members of each house
creates another reason for determining whether an act makes an appropriation or not. State ex rel. Mills v. Wilder 70 illustrates the
problem. A 1950 act imposed an additional two cent motor fuel tax,
allocated one cent of it to the use of the State Highway Commission
and the other one cent to the use of the counties and townships for
feeder and farm-to-market roads, and provided for its administration.
The court concluded that the act authorized money to be paid out of
the state treasury and did not merely dedicate the revenues from
the tax to designated funds or purposes; therefore, the act made an
appropriation. As it made an appropriation and was not a general
appropriation act, it must be enacted with the necessary two-thirds
vote to be effective. It did not receive such a vote. It seems quite
clear that this act dealt with only one subject and that its appropriations were probably for only one object. But the act fell afoul of
the special vote requirement.
General One-Subject Provisionsand Appropriation Acts.
Twenty-one 17 1 of the thirty-seven states which have general onesubject provisions in their constitutions have no special ones applicable to appropriation acts. In these states, then, the contents
of bills making appropriations are regulated by the general onesubject provision. Earlier, it was noted that four of these states
expressly except appropriation bills from the one-subject rule. 17 2
Utah excepts "general appropriation laws" from its one-subject
rule. A textual interpretation of the Utah exception could lead to
the conclusion that a general appropriation law could contain any
number of subjects but that a special one must be confined to one subject. However, it may be questioned whether an act making appropriations for all state departments and containing riders purporting to
make or to change general law would be properly classified as a
general appropriations law. The Utah court has declared that, despite the exception, a general appropriation act may not modify,
amend, or repeal existing substantive law.' 3 The Utah court, thus,
170. 73 S.D. 330, 42 N.W.2d 891 (1950). Barnsdall Refining Corp. v.
Welsh, 64 S.D. 647, 269 N.W. 853 (1936), involves a similar problem.
171. Del., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo.,
Nev., N.J., Ohio, Ore., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va., and Wash. See Table I
for a summary of the constitutional provisions.
172. Del., Mo., Tex., and Utah. See note 111 supra.
173. State ex rel. Davis v. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 104, 95 Pac. 1071, 107273 (1908). The 1907 Utah general appropriations act limited the payments
to be made to court stenographers for travel to reimbursement for money
actually paid out by them for that purpose, not to exceed ten cents per mile.
An 1899 law authorized the judge to make a contract to pay the court stenog-
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reaches the conclusion which is reached in most states having a
general one-subject rule without an exception for appropriation
laws. With respect to a special appropriations act, Utah assumes
74
that the act must be limited to one subject.
Delaware, making what seems the broadest exception, excepts
"bills appropriating money for public purposes." A textual interpretation could lead to the conclusion that any act appropriating
money, whether a general or special appropriations act, could contain any number of subjects. The question would be raised, though,
whether acts containing more than appropriations and related provisions remain "bills appropriating money for public purposes."
Doesn't the exception impose a limitation on the bill that it only
appropriate money? Remarkably, no Delaware case dealing with
this question was found.
Missouri and Texas except "general appropriation bills, which
may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account
of which moneys are appropriated." On its face this is not a complete exception of general appropriation bills from the one-subject
rule; it seems to state that these bills are excepted from the rule and
then to specify the permissible contents of the bills.1 5 In short, this
seems to be not an exception in the technical sense, but rather a
declaration that a general appropriation act deals with a single
subject. Both the Missouri and Texas courts have concluded that
the one-subject provision, including its exception, preclude legislation of a general character from an appropriation act. The rationale
is that inclusion of this general legislation in the act adds a second
subject to the act, the first being appropriations, and that the onesubject provision limits the act to a single subject.
The question most frequently arises where it is contended that a
provision of the general appropriations act is in conflict with a prerapher for each mile travelled an amount not to exceed ten cents per mile.
The Utah court held that the appropriation rider did not alter the mileage
payment which a court stenographer was entitled to under a contract entered
into under the 1899 law. The court concludes that the legislature did not intend that the rider apply to contracts made under the 1899 law. However, had
it intended that the rider should apply, then the court concludes that it could
not be effective. While this is only a dictum, the court seems to give positive
notice that this will be their holding when they are asked to rule. No other
Utah case was found dealing with the question. Interestingly, in reaching its
conclusion the court noted that if riders of this kind were permitted members
of the legislature not on the committee reporting the bill might be misled into
voting for subjects foreign to appropriations without intending to do so.
174. Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 146, 197
P.2d 477, 496-97 (1948).
175. This approach is explicitly recognized in State ex reL. Hueller v.
Thompson, 316 Mo. 272, 277-78, 289 S.W. 338, 340-41 (1926), and Conley v.
Daughters of the Republic, 151 S.W. 877, 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), rev'd,
106 Tex. 80, 156 S.W. 197 (1913).
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existing general law. For example, a 1934 Missouri general appropriations act appropriated $3,000 from the general revenue fund
to pay salaries and expenses of the Board of Barber Examiners.
The act creating the Board provided that warrants for the operation
of the Board should be paid only out of its fund. The court concluded that the appropriations provision attempts to change the
general law and because general law cannot be included in an
appropriations act that the provision is void. 7 6
State ex rel. Huellerv. Thompson 7 7 involved a provision in the
1925 Missouri general appropriation act which limited the salaries
of officers and employees whose salary was not definitely fixed by
general law to the amount paid during the preceding biennium. The
existing law was found to give to a certain board the authority to
fix the salaries of certain of its employees. The appropriations act
provision conflicts with the general law. While the provision would
seem to be invalid because of this conflict, the language of the
opinion suggests that the fixing of salaries is not a proper subject
of an appropriations act because this is general legislation. In
Conley v. Daughters of the Republic' 7 S it was argued that a 1911
appropriations act provision directing that a $5,000 appropriation
be expended under direction of Superintendent of Buildings and
Grounds for the improvement of the Alamo repealed by implication
a 1905 act under which the governor had given custody of the Alamo
to the Daughters. This argument was rejected and it was asserted
that even had this been the legislative intent it could not be given
effect because it would violate the one-subject rule.
The general rule that an appropriation rider may not amend,
repeal, or conflict with a prior law should not be read to mean that
a general appropriations act may not be inconsistent with a prior
general law. For example, the appropriations act may fail to provide the funds to carry out an act and thus the act die of inanition;
this does not invalidate the general appropriations act in any way.? 9
176. State ex rel. Davis v. Smith, 335 Mo. 1069, 75 S.W.2d 828 (1934).
To the same effect is State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo. 121, 113 S.W.2d

783 (1938), rev'd on other grounds, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
177. 316 Mo. 272, 289 S.W. 338 (1926).
178. 151 S.W. 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), rev'd, 106 Tex. 80, 156 S.W.
197 (1913). The Texas Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict
between the appropriation act and the 1905 act, that both the Superintendent
and the Daughters could carry out their duties under the law and that, conrary to the view of the other courts, the Daughters were not entitled to an
iniunction to restrain the Superintendent from entering upon the Alamo
grounds. King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682, 687-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941),
recognizes the rule that an appropriation rider may not amend prior law.
179. See Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, 151 S.W. 877, 884 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912), rev'd, 106 Tex. 80, 156 S.W. 197 (1913).
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Also, under some circumstances at least, a limitation may be placed
upon an appropriation which is inconsistent with a prior law and yet
the limitation be held effective. Linden v. Finley8 0 involved the
validity of a limitation on an appropriation in the 1897 Texas general appropriation act permitting the comptroller to approve payments of fees and costs to district attorneys of only a single fee
where a single defendant is convicted in two or more cases unless
the sentences were made cumulative. Prior law gave the district
attorney his fees in each such case whether the sentences were concurrent or cumulative. In an action for a writ of mandamus to
compel the comptroller to make payment in accordance with prior
law, the court concluded that the rider did not purport to change
the existing law but to limit the payment of fees out of the appropriation made. It was said that the one-subject provision does not
prohibit the legislature from limiting the appropriations it makes.
The court expressly noted that it did not decide whether the district
attorney was entitled to his fees in cases resulting in concurrent
sentences; it merely decided that he could not be paid those fees
out of the appropriations made in the 1897 act.
State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada'8l involved an appropriation in
the general appropriation act for out-of-state tuition grants to
Negro students. The general law established this program and
granted the full tuition to qualified college students but the appropriation act contained a proviso limiting the total amount paid to
the difference between the out-of-state college's tuition and the
tuition charged at the University of Missouri for residents. The
Missouri court found this proviso was unconstitutional as an attempt
to change general legislation in an appropriation bill. While the
distinction in Linden v. Finley is tenable, the general law is amended
by the rider for all practical purposes, and so is not the Canada
decision the sounder?
It is also held that the general appropriations act may not contain general legislation. Moore v. Sheppard"-2 involved a provision
of the 1945 appropriations act requiring all clerks of the courts of
civil appeals to deposit with the state treasury all sums collected
for furnishing unofficial copies of opinions of the court and providing that the comptroller may not issue salary warrant to such a clerk
unless the clerk has executed a monthly affidavit stating he has
retained no such money. The court held that this provision was a
180. 92 Tex. 451, 49 S.W. 578 (1899).
181. 342 Mo. 121, 113 S.W.2d 783, 790 (1938), rev'd on other grounds,
305 U.S. 337 (1938).

182. 144 Tex. 537, 192 S.W.2d 559 (1946).
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matter of general legislation and thus a subject for purposes of the
one-subject rule and that, therefore, the provision is invalid. As
this provision is invalid, no duty to account for this money is imposed and the clerks are entitled to their salary warrants though
they have not executed the affidavit. It appears that the rider was
drafted so as to take advantage of Linden v. Fintey, but the court did
not view this as a mere limitation on the appropriation made. While
this may be its form, the court saw that its practical effect was to
enact a new rule of conduct; the rider did not merely prescribe
the conditions under which the appropriations made may be disbursed. Missouri recognizes this general rule, too.1 88
The remaining seventeen'8 4 of these twenty-one states regulate
the contents of appropriations acts through the simple mandate,
"no law shall embrace more than one subject."
It is not seriously argued now that a general appropriations act
violates the general one-subject rule; an act making appropriations
for the operation of the various departments and agencies of government deals with a single subject even though a large number of
appropriation items concerning the entire range of governmental
programs is included.1' 5 As pointed out earlier, there seems also
to be no serious doubt about the power of the legislature to include
in a general appropriations act, in addition to the items of appropriation, provisions regulating the circumstances under which the
moneys appropriated may be disbursed and provisions safeguarding
the disbursements made. The doubts concerning the validity of
riders in appropriations acts arise when it is questioned whether the
legislature has in the particular case gone further than this and
when it is asked whether the legislature may go further. The validity
of the rider is solved bylmost courts by determining whether the
rider introduces a second subject into the act so that the act then
violates the single subject limitation. 88
The clearest instance of violation of the purpose of constitutional
rule and of the introduction of a second subject occurs where the
rider purports to enact permanent legislation not in any way connected with appropriations. The Miller-Tydings Act, which author183.

State ex tel. Hueller v. Thompson, 316 Mo. 272, 289 S.W. 338

(1926).
184. Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mich., Mim., Nev., N.J.,
Ohio, Ore., S.C., Tenn., Va., and Wash.
185. Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 81-82, 30 N.W.2d 548, 557 (1947);
Reilly v. Knapp, 105 Kan. 565, 185 Pac. 47 (1919) ; Hailey v. Huston, 25
Idaho 165 136 Pac. 212 (1913) ; State v. Duluth, 238 Minn. 128, 56 N.W.2d
416 (19525.
186. See, e. g., State v. Duluth, 238 Minn. 128, 133, 56 N.W.2d 416,
419-20 (1952) ; Reilly v. Kmapp, 105 Kan. 565, 571-72, 185 Pac. 47, 50 (1919);
Hailey v. Huston, 25 Idaho 165, 168-69, 136 Pac. 212, 214 (1913).
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ized the state fair trade laws was a rider to a congressional appropriations act and is a classic example. The rider may, in such a case,
get acceptance because of the necessity of passing the appropriations
act; this epitomizes log-rolling.
The 1919 Kansas general appropriations act contained a provision declaring that no one may be appointed to any office or position
in any branch of the government who is related by blood or marriage
to the head or chief or the chief assistant or secretary. It was held
that this provision was in form a general law fixing qualifications for
certain offices and as such introduced a second subject and so was
void. 38 The court declared, however, that the act could validly
have provided that none of the money appropriated could be paid
to any person so related to certain officers; this provision, declared
the court, would not be a separate and distinct subject from appropriations; it would be but a limitation on the appropriations
made. The questions raised earlier whether the form of the provision
should be as important as the Kansas court suggests seem applicable
here, too.
The other instance in which a violation of the constitutional rule
may occur is where the rider is in conflict with an existing act of
the legislature. It is generally said that such a rider purports to
amend or repeal the prior law, that such amendment or repeal is a
separate subject of legislation, and that therefore the rider is void
because it violates the one-subject rule.881 Sometimes it is simply
declared that the legislature may not enact, amend, or repeal general
law in an appropriation act. The nature of the conflict and the
character of the legislative rule under consideration varies; and
perhaps the result should depend upon Jhe precise circumstances.
Hailey v. Huston' 9 involves a general appropriations act, one
item of which was alleged to increase the salaries of a librarian and
his assistant over that prescribed in a section of the revised statutes.
The court concluded that if the provision did have that effect then
a second subject was introduced into the act; as this violates the
constitution, the provision does not raise the salaries. While the
suit questioned only the librarians' .right to the increased salaries, the
court seems to assume that the appropriation was effective as such,
though not effective to raise the salary above the statutory limit. It is
questionable whether the decision is sound; the amount of an
officer's or employee's salary seems very germane to the appropria187. Reilly v. Knapp, 105 Kan. 565, 185 Pac. 47 (1919).
188. Halley v. Huston, 25 Idaho 165, 136 Pac. 212 (1913).
189. 25 Idaho 165, 136 Pac. 212 (1913).
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tions and not to introduce a second subject. If this is true, does it
matter that there is an existing law setting the salary? Further, the
log-rolling evil does not seem to exist in this case. Appropriating
involves deciding what to spend money for and how much; is not
deciding the salary a central part of this process? This case demonstrates that it is a mistake to include maximum salaries in general
laws. To change them the law must be amended; that may require
the legislature to consider a particular officer's salary as an individual matter and not in the context of the general salary struc190
ture.
The result reached in a pair of South Carolina cases may be
more sound. 1' However, the South Carolina court does not squarely
face the objection based on the one-subject rule. The court does note,
though, that the general appropriation act is generally the most
studied bill each session and that it is unlikely that the substantial
appropriation involved did not receive adequate consideration on
its merits.
The only Minnesota case which has considered the validity of
riders in general appropriations acts is State v. Duluth. 92 At the
time the general appropriations act for 1948 and 1949 was enacted
the statutes provided that various local units of government should
reimburse the public examiner for his examination of their records
and the like, except that the charge for salaries of examiners shall
not exceed $10 per day. The appropriation act established a revolving fund to finance the operations of the public examiner and
provided for full reimbursement for the expenses of examination,
without the limit contained in the prior statute. The court concluded the appropriation act provision was intended to be a permanent law and that the legislature may enact such a provision. The
190. Texas solves this problem by passing at each regular session of the
legislature an act suspending for the ensuing biennium the limitations on salaries fixed in the various general laws and providing that the salaries shall be
those set in the general appropriation act for the ensuing biennium. See, e.g.,

Tex. Gen. & Spec. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 4.

191. Brooks v. Jones, 80 S.C. 443, 61 S.E. 946 (1908). The general law
set the clerk of Supreme Court's salary at $800 per year; the 1908 general
appropriation act prescribed a salary of $1,000. Without discussion the court
affirmed the circuit court's order directing the Comptroller General to issue
his warrant in accordance with the appropriation act Plowden v. Beattie, 185
S.C. 229, 193 S.E. 651 (1937), involved an appropriation act provision which
reduced the amount of the state's two-thirds share of the county auditors'
salary by a stated per cent of that prescribed in a prior law. This appropriation act was given effect. The court quoted with approval from the circuit
judge's decree which was affirmed in the Brooks case to the effect that although an appropriation act is generally of temporary duration, it has equal
effect and force of a permanent statute. The title-subject clause is quoted, and
it decided that the title is adequate.

192. 238 Minn. 128, 56 N.W.2d 416 (1952).
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court reasoned that implied repeal of the prior law is an effect and
not a subject; thus, the appropriations act is limited to the single
subject of appropriations and is entirely valid. The court quite
properly notes that for it to hold that an implied repeal is a separate
subject would be to preclude any implied repeal in a general appropriations act. The traditional answer is that a repeal or amendment,
implied or express, of a prior law is a separate subject. Minnesota is
alone in saying it is an effect and not a subject. If the court is saying
that any implied repeal or amendment is merely an effect, then any
rider which has this effect may be included in a general appropriation
act. Supposedly, a rider enacting a new general law would be
invalid, but one repealing or amending a prior one would not. Such
a distinction is not appealing; it seems to be a distinction without
any real difference. If the Duluth case is as broad as suggested, evils
at which the one-subject rule was aimed will be tolerated by that
case. However, the court's statement that the one subject of the act
is "appropriation of money for the operation of state government"
strongly suggests that the case is much narrower. If the riders are
germane to the subject of appropriations, then they are valid even
though they conflict with prior general law. This may be the true
holding of the case. If it is, then the Duluth case is the most reasonable solution of the question. If a rider could properly be included
in the appropriation act, the fact alone that it conflicts with a prior
law ought not render it invalid under the one-subject rule.
Power,Inc. v. Huntley'9" is interesting on several scores. A 1951
law passed at an extraordinary session contained in its first two
sections general appropriations and in sections three through fortyfour a corporate excise tax. After concluding that the tax provisions
were unconstitutional for other reasons, the court concluded that
the act embraced two subjects. In reaching this conclusion, the
court examined legislative history to learn that these two portions
had failed of passage as separate measures but had passed after
being joined. This is the only case found in which the court found
that log-rolling had in fact been used in the enactment of the act in
question. The court seems almost to use the fact of log-rolling to find
plurality of subjects which enables it to strike down the act. Quite
correctly, the court concludes that the entire act must fall. Also, this
is the only case found which invalidated the entire general appropriation act for violation of the one-subject rule. In the other cases,
though, the vice was attachment of an improper rider and not combination of two major measures into one.
193. 39 Wash.2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
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South Carolina has taken the position that provisions for raising
the revenue to pay the appropriations made may be included in the
general appropriations act, viewing these provisions merely as means
to consummate the primary object of the act. 9 '
With respect to special appropriation acts, the requirement that
"no law shall embrace more than one subject" seems to be the
equivalent of the requirement discussed earlier that "all other (i.e.,
other than general) appropriations be made by separate bills, each
embracing but one subject." Thus, the cases previously discussed
from the jurisdictions having this latter provision seem applicable
in the jurisdictions presently under examination. 95
There seems to be no serious contention that an appropriation
is in itself a second subject; therefore, an act may, for example,
establish an agency, set out the regulatory program, and make an
appropriation for the agency without violating the one-subject
rule. 1 6
Similar Minnesota and Texas acts received quite different
treatment in the courts. A 1933 Minnesota act appropriated all
revenues from an intoxicating beverages tax, just enacted, to be
used by the state board of control for direct and work relief and
authorized the board to undertake various public projects, such as
flood control, water supply, soil conservation, and reforestation.
While the act contained a number of topics, the court concluded that
the act related to the single object of appropriating funds for direct
and work relief to alleviate the distress caused by the depression." 7
A 1940 Texas act granted to five counties one-half of state property
taxes to be collected for five years to be used for a number of purposes, including soil conservation, general relief, and joint projects
with the W.P.A. It was held that each purpose for which the tax
money was appropriated to the counties was a separate subject and
that the act was invalid." The purpose of the Texas act seems, also,
to have been the relief of unemployment and destitution flowing from
the depression. This would give the act unity and render its subject
single. Prima facie, there seems to have been no log-rolling here.
194. Crouch v. Benet, 198 S.C. 185, 17 S.E.2d 320 (1941).
195. The seventeen states listed in footnote 181 supra and all of the
four states listed in footnote 169, supra, except Delaware, deal with questions
of the permissible contents of bills making appropriations, except general
appropriation acts, by using the general one-subject rule.
196. See State ex rel. Olsen v. Board of Control of State Institutions,

85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533 (1902).

197. Moses v. Olson, 192 Mirm. 173, 255 N.W. 617 (1934).
198. McCombs v. Dallas County, 136 S.W.2d 975 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940). Error was refused in County v. McCombs, 135 Tex. 272, 140 S.W.2d

1109 (1940).
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B. Codes and Revisions
More and more our law is becoming statutory. A number of
factors explain this. We are turning more frequently to the legislature for solutions of social and economic problems. Reform and
further development of the common law has been largely taken over
by the legislature. Desire for greater certainty often leads to demands
for codification of bodies of the'common law. All this legislative
activity creates another need-the need for periodic revision of the
statutory law to provide greater coherence and consistency, to remove conflicts, and simply to compile. Statutory revision, whether
it purports to change the substance or only the form, generally
encompasses a substantial body of law. Because the act containing
a code, revision, or compilation deals with a wide range of topics,
it may encounter the objection that it embraces more than one subject.
A leading case is Johnson v. Harrison.9 9 An 1889 act, entitled,
"An act to establish a Probate Code," is divided into 21 chapters,
contains 326 sections, and deals with the procedure in proceedings
before the probate court and with estates of deceased persons and
persons under guardianship. Reversing the probate court, Judge
Mitchell held the act to embrace but one subject, declaring:
All that is required is that the act should not include legislation so incongruous that it could not, by any fair intendment,
be considered germane to one general subject. The connection or
relationship of several matters, such as will render them germane
to one subject and to each other, can be of various kinds, as, for
example, of means to ends, of different subdivisions of the same
subject, or that all are designed for the same purpose, or that
both are designated by the same term. Neither is it necessary
that the connection or relationship should be logical; it is
enough that the matters are connected with and related to a
single subject in popular signification.
[T]he term 'Probate Code' may and should be construed as
meaning 'the body or system of law relating to the estates of
deceased persons and of persons under guardianship. In common understanding, this is as distinct and clearly defined a
branch of the law as is criminal law or corporation law, and in
popular signification the term 'probate law' includes all matters
of which probate courts generally have jurisdiction, among
which is 'estates of deceased persons'. An examination of this
act will show that all of its provisions are connected with this
general subject. The fact that some of them relate to matters of
mere procedure, while others define and fix right of property, is
no valid objection to the law. The same objection might be urged
199. 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923 (1891).
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against many acts the constitutionality of which has never been
questioned. Neither is the fact important that a law contains
matters that might be, and usually are, contained in separate
acts, or would be more logically classified as belonging to different subjects, provided only they are germane to the general
subject of the act in which they are put. The legislature is not
limited to the most logical or philosophical classification. The
law of wills and of title to property by descent is a part of the law
relating to the estates of deceased persons, and hence is, in popular understanding,
if not logically, a part of the general subject
200
of probate law.
The approach that a code or revision deals with a single subject
and so complies with the rule is more sound than that the onesubject rule is not intended to apply to general code revisions, as a
Virginia case declared. 20' The constitutional provision does not
justify the conclusion that this exception exists. Also, this approach
means that if the act is a revision there is no limit on what may be
included. The Virginia court's concern that the provisions of the act
have a natural connection indicates that it did not intend to announce
an exception but merely to declare that such an act satisfies the one
subject rule.
The view expressed by Judge Mitchell is certainly sound. Both
substantive and formal statutory revision are most important legislative activities. The combination of provisions on a large number
of topics is not for purposes of log-rolling but for purposes of bringing greater order and cohesion to the law or of getting a coordinated
improvement of the law's substance. There is a rational and practical reason for the combination of topics on the subject of private
corporations, for example, and so the private corporations code
should be held constitutional.
C. Revenue Acts
For practical legislative reasons, some legislatures use the omnibus tax bill. When it wishes to create a tax or to change the rates
or other provisions of existing taxes, instead of passing a separate
act for each tax dealt with during a legislative session, the legislature
places all or practically all of its tax legislation for the session in a
202
single bill.
Taxes are imposed to produce revenue to carry on the business
of government. Where it is necessary to increase taxes to provide
200. Id. at 578-79, 50 N.W. at 924-25.
201. See Macke v. Commonvealth, 156 Va. 1015, 1019, 159 S.E. 148,
149 (1931).
202. The Texas legislature has used this device. See, e.g., Tex. Gen. &
Spec. Sess. Laws 1941, c. 184; Tex. Gen. & Spec. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 402.
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the revenue to meet increased expenditures for the next fiscal period,
there is often an understandable desire on the part of the legislature
to spread equally the increased burden among all the different
groups of taxpayers. Placing provisions making equitable increases
in the rates of all of the major taxes in a single bill makes this end
less difficult to attain than using separate bills would. The assumption that the organized pressure groups will resist additional taxes
less if they feel assured others are sharing in the increased burden
may also account for the use of this device. This device permits the
decision as to the rates for all taxes, for example, to be made in the
same bill.
Where the omnibus tax act has been questioned it has been held
valid. The 1941 Texas Omnibus Tax Law contained twenty-one
sections, nineteen of which imposed a different tax. Declaring that
an act may contain more than one subject if they are all germane or
subsidiary to the main subject, the court held this act valid.20 3 The
court declared that a general revenue measure may cover the entire
field for assessing revenue, set up machinery for collecting it, allocate it to stated purposes, and make all necessary provisions incidental to revenue20 4collection. Minnesota has also approved the general revenue act.
VII. Laws Exempt from One-Subject Rule
A number of the provisions setting out the constitutional onesubject rule contain express exceptions. The Alabama and Oklahoma constitutions, for example, except "general appropriation bills,
general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision
of statutes."20 5 Two questions arise concerning these exceptions.
First, what must be the character of an act for it to fit the description in the exception and so be free of the one-subject limitation?
Secondly, are they true exceptions or merely declarations that acts
fitting the description comprise a single subject?
General AppropriationsActs. The most common exception is
the one for general appropriation acts. It is found in eleven constitutions.2 0 6 This exception was explored earlier in the portion of this
paper devoted to appropriation acts.
Code, Digest, or Revision. Two states except "bills adopting a
203. City of Beaumont v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 163 S.W.2d 426

(Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
204. C. Thomas Stores Sales System, Inc. v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504,
297 N.W. 9 (1941).
205. Ala. Const. art. 4, § 45; Okla. Const. art. 5, § 57.
206. Ala., Colo., Del., Mo., Mont., N.M., Okla., Pa., Tex., Utah, and
Wyo.
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code, digest, or revision of statutes,' ' 207 and four states except "bills
for the codification and revision of the laws. 20 11 The question that
immediately arises is: what is a code, digest, codification, or revision for purposes of these provisions?
The Alabama court seems to say that it is an act making a formal
revision of some body of the existing law.20 9 That is, an act making
substantive changes, not mere changes in language and arrangement,
is not a code for purposes of the exception. The court declares that
a bill to be within the exception must state in its title its subject
substantially in the terms of the exception. Then as a bill "to adopt
a code" it will direct the legislator's attention elsewhere for the contents of the code; that elsewhere is the existing law. Thus, apparently, the bill must follow the existing law. The court readily pointed
out that this does not mean that the legislature may not enact a bill
making a substantive revision of a substantial body of the law. However, in doing so, the legislature must comply with the one-subject
requirement.
Mention of the exception is made in a Utah case. 210 A 1909 act,
replacing a complete title of the compiled laws and a chapter of another title, substituted a single county road commissioner for several
road supervisors and a $2 road poll tax for two days labor or a $3
payment and re-enacted the substance of the laws relating to county
road finance, administration, maintenance, and improvement. The
court found that the act dealt with a single subject and did not discuss what was a codification and general revision of the laws for
purposes of the exception. The court declared, however, that consolidations, codifications, and revisions must comply with the onesubject rule. The exception was said to show that the one-subject
rule was directed primarily at new legislation. The exception seems
to prevent the court from classifying an act as dealing with two
subjects merely because it has consolidated in one act material the
legislature has previously dealt with separately - a fact which has
sometimes inclined a court to find two or more subjects are involved.
It seems to have little other effect.
The exception seems not to be a true exception at all; it seems
to be a declaration that acts having the described purpose relate to
but one subject. 211 If the express exception were a true exception,
207. Ala. and Okla.
208. Mont., N.M., Utah, and Wyo.
209. Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 106 So. 231 (1925).
210. Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 46 Utah 60, 148 Pac. 1104 (1915).
211. See Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 103, 151 So.
858, 861 (1934). It suggests as much as to acts which adopt codes and states
as much as to revenue bills.
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a bill to adopt a revision of the laws would be constitutional even
though it dealt with .two or more subjects and even though it had
no title or a defective one. However, both the Gibson and Wilson
cases reject this; in fact, the Gibson case declares that an act adopting a code relating to game and fish and to fertilizers would be invalid because it contains two subjects. These cases, then, are consistent only with the view that the exception is not a true exception.
New York makes its one-subject rule, among others, inapplicable "to any bill ...

which shall be recommended to the legislature

by commissioners or any public agency appointed or directed pursuant to law to prepare revisions, consolidations or compilations of
statutes."'2 12 The New York provision applies only to private or
local bills. As private or local bills are permitted under the New
York constitution in only certain circumstances, 213 the operation of
the one-subject'rule and thus of this exception is quite limited. The
exception provision was adopted in 1874 to free a revision commission from what was felt to be the unnecessary restrictions in such
cases of the one-subject rule, rule as to amendments and prohibition
of private and local laws.2 Apparently, it is felt that the danger of
log-rolling is not materially present in the product of such a public,
non-political body. Unlike the exception in other constitutions, this
seems to be a true exception.
GeneratRevenue Bills. Alabama and Oklahoma except "general
revenue bills" from the one-subject rule. Only Alabama appears to
have announced the meaning of this exception. Again, the court
takes the position that the provision is not a true exception but,
in effect, a declaration that a general revenue bill deals with one
2 15

subject.

Resolutions. While none of the one-subject provisions expressly
except resolutions, several make the provision applicable to resolutions. Delaware makes the rule applicable to a "joint resolution"
and South Carolina to a "resolution." 21 6 Louisiana and Texas have
determined that their one-subject rules are not applicable to resolutions but to laws only. 217 Because of the interpretation of the state
constitution in a number of jurisdictions that resolutions can have
212. N.Y. Const. art. 3, § 21.
213. N.Y. Const art. 3, § 17.
214. NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION COMMITTEE, PROBLEMS RELATING TO LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS 100-02 (1938).

215. Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 151 So. 858 (1934).
216. Del. Const art. 2, § 16; S.C. Const. art. 3, § 17.
217. See Gilmore v. State, 79 So.2d 192, 197 (La. App. 1955) ; National
Biscuit Co. v. State, 134 Tex. 293, 135 S.W.2d 687 (1940).
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no law-making effect, 21 the question whether the one-subject rule

applies to resolutions is of limited importance.
Ordinances.Only Georgia seems to deal expressly with the question whether the one-subject rule is applicable to the ordinances of
the subordinate units of government within the state. Georgia makes
the one subject rule applicable to a "law or ordinance." While the
Minnesota provision refers only to "law," the Minnesota court con219
siders that the provision applies to city ordinances.
VIII.

EVALUATION OF THE ONE-SUBJECT RULE

When the one-subject rule is examined from the purely pragmatic point of view of the advocate, the rule appears as a weak and
undependable arrow in his quiver. The most remarkable fact that
emerges from this investigation is that, while the rule has been invoked in hundreds of cases, in only a handful of cases have the
courts held an act to embrace more than one subject.220 This seems
to justify courthouse lore to the effect that an argument based on
the one subject rule is often the argument of a desperate advocate
who lacks a sufficiently sound and persuasive one. To the extent
that this argument is considered the hallmark of a weak case, the
advocate may consider it wise to use it very sparingly.
It may be of some interest to speculate upon the reasons for this
small number of cases holding an act to embrace more than one
subject. The simple answer may be that legislatures have shown a
remarkable compliance with the spirit and letter of the rule. A legislator may be well advised to make his bill as narrow and-as brief
as he can because often the narrower the issue presented by the bill
the easier it is to pass. This is a practical legislative consideration
working as a counter-force to log-rolling through the omnibus bill
218. A majority of state constitutions provide that no law shall be

passed except by bill and that to become law a bill must contain the prescribed
enacting clause, must be read on three several days in each house, must have
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title, and must be referred
to and reported from committee. As resolutions do not contain the constitutional enacting clause appropriate only for bills and frequently do not follow
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of bills, it is held in a number of
jurisdictions that a resolution can have no law making effect. For an excellent
survey of the state constitutional provisions and of this troublesome question
see Comment, 31 Texas L. Rev. 417 (1953).
219. Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944); Sverkerson v. Minneapolis, 204 Minn. 388, 283 N.W. 555 (1939).
220. Sinclair, in his excellent survey of the New Jersey cases dealing
with both the title and one-subject requirements, concludes that there was
not a single New Jersey case in which the real vice was plurality of subject
and that all of the cases of invalidity under the title-body clause can be attributed to failure of expression in the title. Sinclair, The Operation of a Constitutional Restraint on Bill-Styling, 2 U. Newark L. Rev. 25, 58 (1937).
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and it may help explain the phenomenon. Certainly one explanation
is the broad definition of subject adopted by the courts and their
understandable reluctance to apply the rule so as to find that an act
violates it. The common presumption of constitutionality - a kind
of judicial deference to the legislature's judgment as to what the
constitution requires - helps to account for this. The one-subject
and other rules regulating form of enactments and legislative procedure pose, in their enforcement in the courts, the question of
judicial-legislative relations in somewhat aggravated form. In finding that the legislature has violated the one-subject rule the court
may impute that an irregularity occurred in the conduct of the business of the legislature - an irregularity offensive to the principle
of majority rule. It is understandable that a court would be reluctant to make such a charge, even by implication.
The principal purpose of the one-subject rule is said to be to
prevent log-rolling. And log-rolling is itself offensive because it subverts the principle of majority rule by enabling two minorities to
combine their legislative strengths to obtain a majority vote for
their respective proposals. While in one sense no rule of law prevents the conduct it condemns but only deters it, it can be said in
a still different sense that the one-subject rule does not prevent
log-rolling. The one-subject rule by its very terms does not proscribe
log-rolling; it only proscribes the combining of separate subjects in
a single bill. The reason, of course, that it condemns bills which embrace more than one subject is that it is assumed that the subjects
were combined in one bill for log-rolling purposes, there being no
other reasonable or practical reason. The approach of the constitution is quite clearly indirect. It is noteworthy that no case was found
which held an act void because it was found that log-rolling was
practiced in its passage. 2 '
The constitution is not only indirect but also is only partial in
its efforts to stamp out log-rolling. It condemns only that log-rolling
which uses a single bill combining provisions on several subjects.
It does not strike at the log-rolling which uses two or more bills.
Thus, three minorities may agree to support each other's bills on
three different subjects and in this way enact three bills which otherwise could not obtain a majority vote. These three bills do not fall
under the constitutional rule aimed at log-rolling - the one-subject
221. It is true, however, that the finding that log-rolling made possible
the passage of the act in question was influential in the court's determination
that the act embraced two subjects and that the entire act, including general
appropriations provisions, was invalid in Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash.2d
191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
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rule - because they each deal with a single subject. Also where the
three minorities are interested in three different measures relating
to the same subject, they may combine their measures in a single
222
bill without running afoul of the one-subject rule.
In view of all this, it may be questioned whether the one-subject
rule makes a sufficient contribution toward the preservation of the
principle of majority rule to deserve retention. Freund, recognizing
their beneficial effects, has wisely pointed out that these constitutional requirements as to style, including the title-body clause, have
produced negative results as well. They have produced an enormous
amount of litigation, resulted in the nullification of beneficial laws,
created serious drafting problems, and served as technical loopholes
of escape from the law. 223 While Freund's criticism is more pertinent to the title and other requirements, it does raise the question
whether the benefits obtained from the one-subject rule sufficiently
outweigh its negative results to justify the retention of the rule.
It is an oversimplification to conclude that the one-subject rule
reaches only the form and not the substance of log-rolling. If the
rule is viewed simply as compelling a log-rolling coalition to use
three bills instead of one, the rule must still be considered a significant deterrent to log-rolling, or at least to successful log-rolling. 224
No matter how meritorious a bill is, its enactment is not automatic.
It takes considerable effort by its proponents to get any bill passed.
The presiding officer must be encouraged to send it to a favorable
committee, the chairman needs to be coaxed to set it for hearing at
an advantageous time, the most persuasive witnesses must be arranged for, the sub-committee must be encouraged to reject unfavorable amendments and report the bill favorably to the full
committee, the full committee must be encouraged to report the
bill out favorably as soon as practicable, and so on through every
step of the way through the signing of the bill by the governor. In
some cases, it may be largely a question of overcoming inertia and
getting attention directed to the bill instead of to the number of
other bills demanding attention. Generally speaking, it will take
more effort to get three bills passed than to get one. The one-subject
222. It should be remembered, however, that there is a group of cases
holding invalid acts dealing with a single general subject where there was no

unity among the several provisions of the act.
223. Fretmd, Standards of American Legislation 155-57 (1917).
224. While I assume the responsibility, I want to express my gratitude
to the members of the Texas legislature who counselled me for the information and insights they gave me as to the practical legislative considerations
which aided me in making the following analysis. I am especially indebted to
Hon. Barefoot Sanders of Dallas and Hon. J. C. Zbranek of Daisetta of the
Texas House of Representatives for conferences with them.
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rule may force the coalition to expend three times the effort to pass
its three bills than it would have had to expend to pass a single
omnibus bill. By increasing the effort required of the coalition, the
rule reduces the probability that the coalition will meet with full
success.
By forcing this coalition to use three bills instead of one, the
one-subject rule increases, for still another reason, the probability
that the coalition will not attain all of its objectives. A bicameral
legislature, contemplating a complete re-consideration in each house,
places a number of hurdles in the way of each bill which must be
negotiated before it becomes a law. Every session of any American
state legislature sees a number of bills fail of enactment which would
have received majority approval had they been able to gain attention and action at each of the way stations. This means that, no
matter how hard the coalition labors for each bill, it is probable that
some of the coalition's bills will be sidetracked or be blocked by some
bottleneck. The fact that the coalition must use three bills instead
of one may increase by three the probability that they may fail because of some fortuitous circumstance inherent in the legislative
process.
The foregoing factors mean that the one-subject rule by forcing
the coalition to use three bills instead of one to put over its joint
program makes successful log-rolling more difficult. Several other
factors may even discourage the formation of the coalition. The
mere fact that the probability of success for each of the participants
in the joint enterprise is thus made doubtful may, of itself, discourage formation of the coalition. Another factor may deter formation,
too. By requiring the coalition to use three bills instead of one, the
one-subject rule makes it known to the participants that success
will not come to each at the same time. While one bill is receiving
the governor's signature, another may still be awaiting final committee action in the first house. It is likely that the ardor of the
participant whose bill has been enacted into law will cool; as soon
as he obtains his objective, he may leave the remaining tasks largely
up to the others. Anyone experienced in legislative matters knows
of this likelihood and will therefore be reluctant to enter a joint
enterprise that entails this risk. Still another factor may operate to
deter persons from entering into such a joint enterprise. By requiring three separate bills, the one-subject rule forces the participants
in the coalition 'to acknowledge openly their participation in a coalition; if, however, a single bill could be used, their support of it
could be explained simply in terms of their interest in one portion.

19581
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Because the one-subject rule may force the participants of a coalition
to admit openly their participation in a log-rplling, vote-trading
scheme, and because legislative tradition condemns vote-trading,
the one-subject rule may deter the formation of a coalition.
Another important purpose of the one-subject rule is said to be
to facilitate an orderly and rational legislative process. It is certainly true that the one-subject rule is important to a proper legislative process. However, the question should be asked whether this
rule should not be placed only in the legislative rules instead of in
the constitution. To answer this question an examination must be
made of the purposes and effects of the inclusion of rules governing
legislative procedure in a constitution.
The constitution makers very probably included the various provisions regulating form and procedure so as to provide a minimum
guarantee for an orderly and fair legislative process. A way for the
people to make certain that the legislature will have a particular rule
of procedure is to prescribe it in the constitution. It may be doubted,
however, whether it is necessary to put the one-subject rule in the
constitution in order to insure that the legislature has the benefits
of it for its own procedure. The House of Representatives adopted,
on its own initiative, the rule requiring amendments to be germane
in 1789. Likewise, the legislatures of several of the states which have
of Repreno constitutional one-subject rule have placed the House
225
sentatives rule on germane amendments in their rules.
However, even if it is assumed that the rule need not be put
into the constitution to insure that the legislature has it, the fact
that it is in the constitution instead of the rules is significant. If the
rule is in the legislative rules only, violation of it may not be invoked
in the courts to strike down the ill-gotten gains of the rule-flaunting
conduct. However, if the rule is in the constitution, then it can be
invoked in the courts. 226 The sanction for the one-subject rule is,
obviously, substantially greater where the rule is placed in the
constitution.
There is still another particular in which it makes a difference
that the one-subject rule is in the constitution instead of only in the
legislative rules. If a rule is only a legislative rule, then the legisla225. Both the Massachusetts House and Senate have copied the congressional rule, House Rule 90 and Senate Rule 50, MANUAL FOR THE
GENERAL COURT 1957-8, as has the Rhode Island House, Rule 20, Rules

of the House of Representatives, RHODE ISLAND MANUAL 1951-1952.
However, neither of the houses in the legislatures of Connecticut, North Carolina and Vermont have done so nor do they have any equivalent.
226. See the previous discussion of the kind of legislative conduct alleged
to fail to conform to constitutional rule which is subject to judicial review
and the extent of the review.
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ture may suspend it. If it is in the constitution, then, except where
the constitution authorizes it, the legislature may not suspend it,
and a minority of one can invoke the rule by raising the point of
order. As the one-subject rule, in part at least, is for the protection
of a temporary minority, it is important that the rule cannot be suspended by a majority willing to disregard traditional procedures.
Freund's criticism that the constitutional rules regulating the
form of laws produce litigation seems not to be especially telling as
to the one-subject rule. While the rule is involved in hundreds of
cases, it is rarely the sole issue and only occasionally one of the
principal issues. This indicates that the one-subject rule does not
invite much litigation. Therefore, its benefits are obtained at comparatively little cost in negative results. While the one-subject rule
is indirect and only partial in its attack on the mischief at which it
is aimed and while it does produce some negative results, it seems
to exert a sufficiently wholesome influence to deserve being retained
in the state constitutions.
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